Two recent Supreme Court of Canada decisions demonstrate that the corporate attribution doctrine is not a one-size-fits-all approach.
Court approval of a sale process in receivership or Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (“BIA”) proposal proceedings is generally a procedural order and objectors do not have an appeal as of right; they must seek leave and meet a high test in order obtain it. However, in Peakhill Capital Inc. v.
The economic fallout from the COVID-19 pandemic will leave in its wake a significant increase in commercial chapter 11 filings. Many of these cases will feature extensive litigation involving breach of contract claims, business interruption insurance disputes, and common law causes of action based on novel interpretations of long-standing legal doctrines such as force majeure.
Executive Summary
In any bankruptcy, there are inevitably winners and losers. The winners do not always do virtuous acts to win and the losers are not necessarily evil. Rather, dividing up a limited pie, the bankruptcy courts must leave some creditors short-changed. A good example is the recent 7th Circuit case involving a supplier and a lender. (hhgregg, Inc. et al. (Debtor). Whirlpool Corporation v. Wells Fargo Bank, National Association, and GACP Finance Co., LLC, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals, No. 18-3363, February 11, 2020) |
Secured creditors filing a UCC financing statement under Article 9 must include a description of the collateral. (UCC 9-502) UCC Article 9 adopts a “notice filing” system, under which the purpose of the filing is to provide notice of a security interest in the specified collateral. UCC Article 9 does not require a precise (e.g., serial number) description. Even so, there has been much litigation over the sufficiency of the collateral descriptions in UCC financing statements.
U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Dennis Montali recently ruled in the Chapter 11 case of Pacific Gas & Electric (“PG&E”) that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) has no jurisdiction to interfere with the ability of a bankrupt power utility company to reject power purchase agreements (“PPAs”).
On May 20, 2019, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its long-awaited decision in Mission Products Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC nka Old Cold LLC, (Case No. 17-1657, U.S. Supreme Court, May 20, 2019) ("Tempnology"). The U.S. Supreme Court decided that a trademark licensee can continue to use a trademark license even when a bankrupt trademark licensor rejects the license agreement.
The Supreme Court this week resolved a long-standing open issue regarding the treatment of trademark license rights in bankruptcy proceedings. The Court ruled in favor of Mission Products, a licensee under a trademark license agreement that had been rejected in the chapter 11 case of Tempnology, the debtor-licensor, determining that the rejection constituted a breach of the agreement but did not rescind it.
Few issues in bankruptcy create as much contention as disputes regarding the right of setoff. This was recently highlighted by a decision in the chapter 11 case of Orexigen Therapeutics in the District of Delaware.
The judicial power of the United States is vested in courts created under Article III of the Constitution. However, Congress created the current bankruptcy court system over 40 years ago pursuant to Article I of the Constitution rather than under Article III.