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On April 19, 2021, the United States Supreme Court denied a petition for certiorari from the Second Circuit’s decision in In re Tribune Company Fraudulent Conveyance Litigation (“Tribune II”),[1] leaving intact the Second Circuit’s decision upholding the safe harbor defense to avoidance actions und

“The discharge of claims in bankruptcy applies with no less force to claims that are meritorious, sympathetic, or diligently pursued. Though the result may chafe one’s innate sense of fairness, not all unfairness represents a violation of due process.”

On March 19, 2021, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit issued a unanimous decision[1] affirming that the mutuality requirement of section 553(a) of the Bankruptcy Code must be strictly construed and, therefore, that triangular setoffs are not permissible in bankruptcy.

In a recent decision, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the election of a tenant, under Section 365(h) of the Bankruptcy Code, to remain in possession of real property governed by a rejected lease causes a third-party guaranty on another rejected agreement to remain in effect, to the extent such agreement and the lease are part of an integrated transaction.

In a decision arising out of Tribune’s 2008 bankruptcy, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently issued a decision affirming confirmation of the media conglomerate’s chapter 11 plan over objections raised by senior noteholders who contended that the plan violated their rights under the Bankruptcy Code by not according them the full benefit of their prepetition subordination agreements with other creditors.

Analyzing the inner workings of the elements required for the securities contract “safe harbor” protection under Section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code, the Bankruptcy Court for the SDNY dismissed a complaint seeking to recover approximately US$1 billion in allegedly fraudulent transfers brought against various transferees as part of the Boston Generating Chapter 11 case.

It is well established that by filing a proof of claim in bankruptcy, a creditor submits itself to the equitable jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court and waives any right it would otherwise have to a jury trial with respect to any issue that “bears directly on the allowance of its claim.” Such a waiver normally applies in fraudulent transfer actions, since under Section 502(d) of the Bankruptcy Code the court must disallow a claim of any entity that received an avoidable transfer.

Two courts recently answered “yes,” finding that environmental claims brought against reorganized debtors by government entities were discharged under confirmed Chapter 11 plans of reorganization. In In re Exide Techs., 613 B.R. 79 (D. Del. 2020), the District of Delaware held that pre-petition, non-compensatory air quality penalties imposed on a Chapter 11 debtor by a state regulator were subject to discharge in bankruptcy. And in In re Peabody Energy Corp.

I.Exide Techs.: the Bankruptcy Code’s Exceptions to Dischargeability

Disagreeing with the much-critiqued SDNY opinion in Enron, the SDNY bankruptcy court disallowed claims brought by secondary transferees because the original claimants allegedly received millions of dollars in fraudulent transfers and preferences from the Debtors that have not been repaid. Deepening the district spilt on the nature of Section 502(d) of the Bankruptcy Code, the Court held that the defense barring fraudulent transfer-tainted claims focuses on claims—not claimants—and cannot be “washed clean” by a subsequent transfer in the secondary market.

As the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic continues to shake global markets, it is likely that more companies will need to restructure to address liquidity constraints, to right-size their balance sheets, or to implement operational restructurings. In addition to a potential surge in restructurings, the spread of COVID-19 is already having pronounced impacts on companies planning or pursuing restructurings, and further market turmoil may cause even broader changes to the restructuring marketplace.

Potential Increase in Restructuring Activity