Deal structure matters, particularly in bankruptcy. The Third Circuit recently ruled that a creditor’s right to future royalty payments in a non-executory contract could be discharged in the counterparty-debtor’s bankruptcy. The decision highlights the importance of properly structuring M&A, earn-out, and royalty-based transactions to ensure creditors receive the benefit of their bargain — even (or especially) if their counterparty later encounters financial distress.
Background
Should a claim for appraisal rights brought by a former shareholder of a Chapter 11 debtor be subordinated under Section 510(b) of the Bankruptcy Code? According to the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware, the answer is yes. See In re: RTI Holding Co., LLC, No. 20-12456, 2021 WL 3409802 (Bankr. D. Del. Aug. 4, 2021).
Background
Until recently, courts in the Ninth Circuit have generally followed the minority view that non-debtor releases in a bankruptcy plan are prohibited by Bankruptcy Code Section 524(e), which provides that the “discharge of a debt of the debtor does not affect the liability of any other entity on, or the property of any other entity for, such debt.” In the summer of 2020, the Ninth Circuit hinted that its prohibition against non-debtor releases was not absolute, when the court issued its decision in Blixseth v. Credit Suisse, 961 F.3d 1074 (9th Cir.
In a recent decision, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the election of a tenant, under Section 365(h) of the Bankruptcy Code, to remain in possession of real property governed by a rejected lease causes a third-party guaranty on another rejected agreement to remain in effect, to the extent such agreement and the lease are part of an integrated transaction.
If a creditor is holding property of a party that files bankruptcy, is it “exercising control over” such property (and violating the automatic stay) by refusing the debtor’s turnover demands? According to the Supreme Court, the answer is no – instead, the stay under Section 362(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code only applies to affirmative acts that disturb the status quo as of the filing date. In other words, the mere retention of property of a debtor after the filing of a bankruptcy case does not violate the automatic stay.
Analyzing the inner workings of the elements required for the securities contract “safe harbor” protection under Section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code, the Bankruptcy Court for the SDNY dismissed a complaint seeking to recover approximately US$1 billion in allegedly fraudulent transfers brought against various transferees as part of the Boston Generating Chapter 11 case.
It is well established that by filing a proof of claim in bankruptcy, a creditor submits itself to the equitable jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court and waives any right it would otherwise have to a jury trial with respect to any issue that “bears directly on the allowance of its claim.” Such a waiver normally applies in fraudulent transfer actions, since under Section 502(d) of the Bankruptcy Code the court must disallow a claim of any entity that received an avoidable transfer.
Leveraged loans continue to be a topic of interest in the current environment, particularly when they are pooled and securitized as collateralized loan obligations. A recent decision sheds light on whether and when leveraged loans and similar instruments may be classified as securities and, therefore, be subject to securities laws.
Two courts recently answered “yes,” finding that environmental claims brought against reorganized debtors by government entities were discharged under confirmed Chapter 11 plans of reorganization. In In re Exide Techs., 613 B.R. 79 (D. Del. 2020), the District of Delaware held that pre-petition, non-compensatory air quality penalties imposed on a Chapter 11 debtor by a state regulator were subject to discharge in bankruptcy. And in In re Peabody Energy Corp.
I.Exide Techs.: the Bankruptcy Code’s Exceptions to Dischargeability
Disagreeing with the much-critiqued SDNY opinion in Enron, the SDNY bankruptcy court disallowed claims brought by secondary transferees because the original claimants allegedly received millions of dollars in fraudulent transfers and preferences from the Debtors that have not been repaid. Deepening the district spilt on the nature of Section 502(d) of the Bankruptcy Code, the Court held that the defense barring fraudulent transfer-tainted claims focuses on claims—not claimants—and cannot be “washed clean” by a subsequent transfer in the secondary market.