When it comes to voting on a plan, Section 1126(e) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that a bankruptcy court may designate (or disallow) the votes of any entity whose vote to accept or reject was not made in “good faith” (a term that is not defined in the Bankruptcy Code).
Section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code shields certain transfers involving settlement payments and other payments in connection with securities contracts (for example, payment for stock) made to certain financial intermediaries, such as banks, from avoidance as a fraudulent conveyance or preferential transfer. In recent years, several circuit courts interpreted 546(e) as applying to a transfer that flows through a financial intermediary, even if the ultimate recipient of the transfer would not qualify for the protection of 546(e).
On October 20, 2017, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued a decision which, among other things,[1] affirmed the lower courts’ holding that certain noteholders were not entitled to payment of a make-whole premium. The Second Circuit held that the make-whole premium only was due in the case of an optional redemption, and not in the case of an acceleration brought about by a bankruptcy filing.
On October 20, 2017, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued an important decision regarding the manner in which interest must be calculated to satisfy the cramdown requirements in a chapter 11 case.[1] The Second Circuit sided with Momentive’s senior noteholders and found that “take back” paper issued pursuant to a chapter 11 plan should bear a market rate of interest when the market rate can be ascerta
On October 3, 2017, Bankruptcy Judge Laurie Selber Silverstein of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware issued a decision holding that the Bankruptcy Court had constitutional authority to approve third-party releases in a final order confirming a plan of reorganization.
In less than a week after its bankruptcy filing, a debtor was able to obtain confirmation of its prepackaged plan of reorganization in the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York. In allowing the case to be confirmed on a compressed timeframe that was unprecedented for cases filed in the Southern District of New York, the Bankruptcy Court held that the 28-day notice period for confirmation of a chapter 11 plan could run coextensively with the period under which creditor votes on the plan were solicited prior to the commencement of the bankruptcy case.
2017年1月07日，在《人民法院报》最新公布的 “2016年度人民法院十大民事行政案件”中，金杜律师事务所代理的江苏舜天船舶股份有限公司（简称“舜天船舶”）破产重整案名列其中。该案不仅是适用最高人民法院和证监会之间会商机制的首个案例，也是上市公司重整同时完成重大资产重组的首个案例，在案件处理的参考性以及对于市场和社会的整体影响方面均意义重大。每年由《人民法院报》编辑部评出的十大案件均为在过去一年中全国各级法院审判的具有重大社会影响力、案情疑难复杂或审判结果有重大突破和借鉴作用的典型案件。
舜天船舶是一家从事船舶和非船舶贸易的国有控股上市公司。受航运及船舶市场持续低迷的影响，自2014年起舜天船舶的经营危机和债务危机开始显现，且日趋严重，渐至资不抵债，面临严峻的退市风险。最终舜天船舶于2016年2月5日被南京市中级人民法院（简称“南京中院”）裁定进入破产重整程序。南京中院通过公开选任方式，经过层层选拔，最终确定金杜为本案管理人，负责开展相关重整工作。
In a June 3, 2016 decision1 , the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware (“the Bankruptcy Court”) invalidated, on federal public policy grounds, a provision in the debtorLLC’s operating agreement that it viewed as hindering the LLC’s right to file for bankruptcy. Such provision provided that the consent of all members of the LLC, including a creditor holding a so-called “golden share” received pursuant to a forbearance agreement, was required for the debtor to commence a voluntary bankruptcy case.
In its recently issued decision in Husky International Electronics, Inc. v. Ritz, a 7-1 majority of the Supreme Court has clarified that intentionally fraudulent transfers designed to hinder or defraud creditors can fall within the definition of “actual fraud” under Section 523(a)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code and can sometimes result in corresponding liabilities being non-dischargeable in a personal bankruptcy proceeding.1
In a March 29, 2016 decision,1 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (the "Court of Appeals") held that creditors are preempted from asserting state law constructive fraudulent conveyance claims by virtue of the Bankruptcy Code's "safe harbors" that, among other things, exempt transfers made in connection with a contract for the purchase, sale or loan of a security (here, in the context of a leveraged buyout ("LBO")), from being clawed back into the bankruptcy estate for distribution to creditors.