When it comes to voting on a plan, Section 1126(e) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that a bankruptcy court may designate (or disallow) the votes of any entity whose vote to accept or reject was not made in “good faith” (a term that is not defined in the Bankruptcy Code).
Section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code shields certain transfers involving settlement payments and other payments in connection with securities contracts (for example, payment for stock) made to certain financial intermediaries, such as banks, from avoidance as a fraudulent conveyance or preferential transfer. In recent years, several circuit courts interpreted 546(e) as applying to a transfer that flows through a financial intermediary, even if the ultimate recipient of the transfer would not qualify for the protection of 546(e).
On October 20, 2017, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued a decision which, among other things,[1] affirmed the lower courts’ holding that certain noteholders were not entitled to payment of a make-whole premium. The Second Circuit held that the make-whole premium only was due in the case of an optional redemption, and not in the case of an acceleration brought about by a bankruptcy filing.
On October 20, 2017, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued an important decision regarding the manner in which interest must be calculated to satisfy the cramdown requirements in a chapter 11 case.[1] The Second Circuit sided with Momentive’s senior noteholders and found that “take back” paper issued pursuant to a chapter 11 plan should bear a market rate of interest when the market rate can be ascerta
On October 3, 2017, Bankruptcy Judge Laurie Selber Silverstein of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware issued a decision holding that the Bankruptcy Court had constitutional authority to approve third-party releases in a final order confirming a plan of reorganization.
Background
Under German law, when a company becomes insolvent or over-indebted, its directors are obliged to file for insolvency. If they fail to fulfil this duty, according to s 64 German limited liability company Act (GmbHG) from this point in time onwards, they have to compensate the company for those payments which (objectively) would not have been made by a prudent businessman. Such imprudence is presumed.
In practice, s 64 is one of the most powerful tools available to insolvency administrators claiming against directors.
The reform of the European insolvency regulation (EIR) comes into force in mid-2017. Inter alia, it will alter the rules on which jurisdiction is competent to open insolvency procedures.
Legal Background
If a debtor needs to file for insolvency, there are two main ways of manipulating the existing legal competence rules:
In less than a week after its bankruptcy filing, a debtor was able to obtain confirmation of its prepackaged plan of reorganization in the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York. In allowing the case to be confirmed on a compressed timeframe that was unprecedented for cases filed in the Southern District of New York, the Bankruptcy Court held that the 28-day notice period for confirmation of a chapter 11 plan could run coextensively with the period under which creditor votes on the plan were solicited prior to the commencement of the bankruptcy case.
Summary
A recent judgment (German FCJ, 10 September 2015, IX ZR 215/13) deals with the question whether the recipient of a payment may be subject to a clawback claim if he returned the received amount to the debtor before the opening of insolvency proceedings.
Background
Introduction
The German FCJ (IX ZR 143/13, 17 December 2015) relates to the requirements and effects of a settlement between an insolvency administrator and the personally liable partners of an insolvent partnership.