On October 3, 2017, Bankruptcy Judge Laurie Selber Silverstein of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware issued a decision holding that the Bankruptcy Court had constitutional authority to approve third-party releases in a final order confirming a plan of reorganization.
In less than a week after its bankruptcy filing, a debtor was able to obtain confirmation of its prepackaged plan of reorganization in the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York. In allowing the case to be confirmed on a compressed timeframe that was unprecedented for cases filed in the Southern District of New York, the Bankruptcy Court held that the 28-day notice period for confirmation of a chapter 11 plan could run coextensively with the period under which creditor votes on the plan were solicited prior to the commencement of the bankruptcy case.
Simple retention of title clauses are commonplace and generally effective in contracts for the sale of goods. However, extending their effect to the proceeds of sale of such goods requires careful drafting.
The Court of Appeal has provided some further clarity around the creation and effects of fiduciary obligations in relation to such clauses.[1]
Proceeds of sale clauses
The Residential Tenancies (Amendment) Act 2015 has undoubtedly strengthened the position of tenants and increased the responsibilities and challenges facing receivers appointed by secured lenders over residential investment properties. While the added protections for tenants are to be welcomed, certain provisions of the Act result in relatively onerous obligations on receivers who are already faced with practical difficulties when seeking to deal with and realise the secured asset in accordance with their duties.
The High Court has reiterated that cross-examination will not generally be permitted on an interlocutory application, or where there is no conflict of fact on the affidavits.
In McCarthy v Murphy,[1] the defendant mortgagor was not permitted to cross-examine the plaintiff (a receiver) or a bank employee who swore a supporting affidavit.
Background
Two recent judgments have brought further clarity in relation to the rights acquirers of loan portfolios to enforce against borrowers:
In AIB Mortgage Bank -v- O'Toole & anor [2016] IEHC 368 the High Court determined that a bank was not prevented from relying on a mortgage as security for all sums due by the defendants, despite issuing a redemption statement which omitted this fact.
In order to understand this case, it is necessary to set out the chronology of events:
In a June 3, 2016 decision1 , the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware (“the Bankruptcy Court”) invalidated, on federal public policy grounds, a provision in the debtorLLC’s operating agreement that it viewed as hindering the LLC’s right to file for bankruptcy. Such provision provided that the consent of all members of the LLC, including a creditor holding a so-called “golden share” received pursuant to a forbearance agreement, was required for the debtor to commence a voluntary bankruptcy case.
In its recently issued decision in Husky International Electronics, Inc. v. Ritz, a 7-1 majority of the Supreme Court has clarified that intentionally fraudulent transfers designed to hinder or defraud creditors can fall within the definition of “actual fraud” under Section 523(a)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code and can sometimes result in corresponding liabilities being non-dischargeable in a personal bankruptcy proceeding.1
The European Court of Justice has held that a director of an English company can be liable for breach of German company law where insolvency proceedings are opened in Germany.