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In a blow to the Lehman Chapter 11 estates, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York held on September 16, 2015 that Intel Corporation’s Loss calculation resulting from a failed transaction under an ISDA Master Agreement was appropriate.1 The decision is significant both because of the dearth of judicial interpretation of the ISDA mechanics regarding the calculation of early termination amounts, and because it affirms the general market understanding that a non-defaulting party has broad discretion in calculating “Loss,” so long as its

On June 29, 2015, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the decision of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York, which held that claims asserted by counterparties in relation to bilateral repurchase agreements do not qualify for treatment as customer claims under the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (“SIPA”).

In a May 4, 2015 opinion1 , the United States Supreme Court held that a bankruptcy court order denying confirmation of a chapter 13 repayment plan is not a final order subject to immediate appeal. The Supreme Court found that, in contrast to an order confirming a plan or dismissing a case, an order denying confirmation of a plan neither alters the status quo nor fixes the rights and obligations of the parties. Although the decision arose in the context of a chapter 13 plan, it should apply with equal force to chapter 11 cases.

As the market for so-called “unitranche” credit facilities continues to increase, the Delaware Bankruptcy Court had an opportunity recently to answer positively the question of whether bankruptcy courts will enforce the Agreement Among Lenders (“AAL”) (a form of intercreditor agreement) used in such structures.

On May 21, 2015, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed a decision of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware, which had approved the structured dismissal of the Chapter 11 cases of Jevic Holding Corp., et al. The Court of Appeals first held that structured dismissals are not prohibited by the Bankruptcy Code, and then upheld the structured dismissal in the Jevic case, despite the fact that the settlement embodied in the structured dismissal order deviated from the Bankruptcy Code’s priority scheme.

In a memorandum decision dated May 4, 2015, Judge Vincent L. Briccetti of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York affirmed the September 2014 decision of Judge Robert D. Drain of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York, confirming the joint plans of reorganization (the “Plan”) in the Chapter 11 cases of MPM Silicones LLC and its affiliates (“Momentive”). Appeals were taken on three separate parts of Judge Drain’s confirmation decision, each of which ultimately was affirmed by the district court:

On March 12, 2015, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the authority of a bankruptcy court to issue non-consensual, non-debtor releases in connection with the confirmation of a plan of reorganization.1   With this decision, the Eleventh Circuit joined the majority view that such releases are permissible under certain circumstances.

Background

On January 21, 2015, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit entered an opinion holding that an authorized UCC-3 termination statement is effective, for purposes of Delaware’s Uniform Commercial Code (the “UCC”), to terminate the perfection of the underlying security interest even though the secured lender never intended to extinguish the security interest and mistakenly authorized the filing.1

Background

On October 17, 2014, the Delaware Supreme Court entered an opinion holding that a UCC-3 termination statement that is authorized by the secured party is effective to terminate the original UCC filing even though the secured party did not actually intend to extinguish the underlying security interest.1 Because the court determined that the relevant section of Delaware’s Uniform Commercial Code (the “UCC”) is unambiguous and

On October 16, 2014, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit entered an order requiring a real estate lender, First National Bank (the “Lender”), to refund certain mortgage payments it received from Protective Health Management (the “Debtor”), an affiliate of its borrower.1   Because  the mortgage payments constituted actual fraudulent transfers, the Fifth Circuit held that the Lender could retain the payments only to the extent of  the value of the Debtor’s continued use of the property.2&