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合伙型基金退出时,合伙人之间可能因存在争议而无法自行组建清算组或虽然组成清算组却无法顺利完成清算。这便引发合伙型基金可否通过法院程序进行司法清算的问题。我们曾代理过一起非常罕见的合伙型基金司法清算的案件,开创上海市指定第三人担任基金清算组负责人的先例,案件在其他诸多方面都在上海地区乃至全国具有领先地位和创新意义。

所谓司法清算,亦即强制清算,是相对于企业自行清算而言,一般是指法院介入合伙型基金清算程序的制度,可以是法院组建清算组,也可能是法院监督清算程序,亦或当清算出现障碍时请求法院排除妨碍等。针对公司的强制清算,最高人民法院出台了《最高人民法院关于适用中华人民共和国公司法>若干问题的规定(二)》(以下简称“《公司法司法解释(二)》”)及《关于审理公司强制清算案件工作座谈会纪要》(以下简称“《公司强清纪要》”)。但有关合伙型基金的清算尚无较为全面和细致的立法体系,因此,合伙型基金通过司法方式进行强制清算的先例很少,且争议颇多。

On September 29, 2020, the United States House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary advanced a Democrat-backed bill to the full chamber that seeks to address perceived shortcomings in the Bankruptcy Code’s protections for employee and retiree benefits and to curtail the use of bonuses and special compensation arrangements for executives in bankruptcy cases.

Recently, in In re Tribune Company, the Third Circuit affirmed that the Bankruptcy Code means exactly what it says and that the enforcement of subordination agreements can be abridged when cramming down confirmation of a chapter 11 plan over a rejecting class entitled to the benefit of the subordination agreement, so long as doing so does not “unfairly discriminate” against the rejecting class (and the other requirements for a cramdown are satisfied).

Analyzing the inner workings of the elements required for the securities contract “safe harbor” protection under Section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code, the Bankruptcy Court for the SDNY dismissed a complaint seeking to recover approximately US$1 billion in allegedly fraudulent transfers brought against various transferees as part of the Boston Generating Chapter 11 case.

No, says the Delaware Bankruptcy Court in In re Maxus Energy Corp. In Maxus, the defendant, Vista Analytical Laboratory, Inc. (“Vista” or the “Defendant”), a designated critical vendor, sought summary judgement dismissing the preference complaint. The Court denied summary judgement finding that the critical vendor status did not per se insulate Vista from preference actions.

Background

It is well established that by filing a proof of claim in bankruptcy, a creditor submits itself to the equitable jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court and waives any right it would otherwise have to a jury trial with respect to any issue that “bears directly on the allowance of its claim.” Such a waiver normally applies in fraudulent transfer actions, since under Section 502(d) of the Bankruptcy Code the court must disallow a claim of any entity that received an avoidable transfer.

In a recent bench ruling, the Delaware bankruptcy court denied a motion to dismiss a chapter 11 bankruptcy filing, notwithstanding the fact that the filing contravened an express bankruptcy-filing blocking right, or “golden share,” held by certain preferred shareholders.

Two courts recently answered “yes,” finding that environmental claims brought against reorganized debtors by government entities were discharged under confirmed Chapter 11 plans of reorganization. In In re Exide Techs., 613 B.R. 79 (D. Del. 2020), the District of Delaware held that pre-petition, non-compensatory air quality penalties imposed on a Chapter 11 debtor by a state regulator were subject to discharge in bankruptcy. And in In re Peabody Energy Corp.

I.Exide Techs.: the Bankruptcy Code’s Exceptions to Dischargeability

Yes, says the First Circuit. The First Circuit recently affirmed the District Court’s decision to deny a group of bondholders’ (the “Bondholders”) motion to have a trustee appointed for the Employees Retirement System of the Government of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico (the “System”) under section 926 of the Bankruptcy Code. Section 926 of the Bankruptcy Code allows a court to appoint a trustee to pursue avoidance actions in Chapter 9 cases.