The Second Circuit Court of Appeals recently held in In re Tribune Company Fraudulent Conveyance Litigation, No. 13-3992-cv (L) (2d Cir., Dec. 19, 2019) that Bankruptcy Code Section 546(e) barred claims seeking to avoid payments made by Tribune to its shareholders as part of a leveraged buyout (LBO).

Yes, says the Third Circuit. The Third Circuit recently held that the Bankruptcy Court has the authority to confirm a chapter 11 plan which contains nonconsensual, third-party releases when such releases are integral to the successful reorganization. The court’s decision in In re Millennium holds that, when the third-party releases are integral to the restructuring of the debtor-creditor relationship, the Bankruptcy Court has the constitutional authority to approve nonconsensual, third-party releases.

Background

In the fifth opinion involving the repo liquidation saga of HomeBanc, the Third Circuit addressed several crucial issues involving the liquidation and valuation of repo collateral in bankruptcy. In re HomeBanc Mortg. Corp., 2019 WL 7161215 (3d Cir. Dec. 24, 2019).

Background

Introduction

Background

Following various disputes as to the scope of the collateral given to secured creditors, the debtors and certain of their noteholders jointly proposed a chapter 11. The plan included a rights offering that the consenting noteholders agreed to backstop. These consenting noteholders were granted the right to purchase significant equity of the reorganized debtors at a discount and receive significant premiums for their agreement to backstop the rights offering and support the plan.

Merit Management

In Mission Products Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC, the U.S. Supreme Court resolved a question that vexed the lower courts and resulted in a circuit split: does the rejection by a debtor-licensor of a trademark license agreement terminate the licensee’s rights under the rejected license?

It is a well-established principle of bankruptcy law that claims generally crystallize as of the bankruptcy petition date. Of course, section 506(b) of the bankruptcy code allows over-secured, secured creditors to recover post-petition interest and costs, including reasonable legal fees, if their documentation provides them with the right to recover these costs. But what about unsecured creditors – are post-petition legal fees incurred by an unsecured creditor whose contract with the debtor provides for reimbursement of legal fees allowed or not?

Bankruptcy Rule 2004 allows the examination of any entity with respect to various topics, including conduct and financial condition of the debtor and any matter that may affect the administration of the estate. Does a subordination agreement that is silent on the use of Rule 2004 prevent the subordinated creditor from taking a Rule 2004 examination of the senior creditor? Yes, says an Illinois bankruptcy court.

近年来，我国宏观经济增长放缓，国家调整产业和信贷政策，并逐渐加强金融监管，商业银行的资产质量压力有所增加，十亿甚至百亿级别的债务逾期或潜在违约浮出水面。这些巨无霸级别的潜在不良贷款风险，迫切要求商业银行审查并改善贷前贷后管理中的遗漏和问题，也对商业银行的危机处理能力提出了更高的挑战。

大敌当前，痛定思痛，当危机来临时，商业银行的管理层和执行层需要的是冷静的思考、周密的策划，以及必要时刻壮士断腕的决策力。从本团队近期参与处理的几项复杂的债务逾期及潜在违约案例来看，危机的表象多种多样，除了资金周转困难带来直接的偿付危机；有的则是债务人控制人挪用公司资金投入股市炒股，有的是公司实际控制人陷入刑事调查和指控，也有的则更为隐蔽，债务人关联主体在境外受到他国政府的调查等等。这些危机虽然不一定直接表现为到期不付，但可能已经导致债务人违反融资文件的陈述、承诺条款，甚至通过交叉违约触发了违约事件或潜在违约事件。

本文旨在梳理危机处理的思路，通盘策划全面追索资产的策略，为贷款管理工作层面制定一份简介易行的“工作方案”，以便为后续的债务重组和清偿争取宝贵的时间，避免弯路：

一、梳理融资文件