On September 29, 2020, the United States House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary advanced a Democrat-backed bill to the full chamber that seeks to address perceived shortcomings in the Bankruptcy Code’s protections for employee and retiree benefits and to curtail the use of bonuses and special compensation arrangements for executives in bankruptcy cases.

Recently, in In re Tribune Company, the Third Circuit affirmed that the Bankruptcy Code means exactly what it says and that the enforcement of subordination agreements can be abridged when cramming down confirmation of a chapter 11 plan over a rejecting class entitled to the benefit of the subordination agreement, so long as doing so does not “unfairly discriminate” against the rejecting class (and the other requirements for a cramdown are satisfied).

Analyzing the inner workings of the elements required for the securities contract “safe harbor” protection under Section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code, the Bankruptcy Court for the SDNY dismissed a complaint seeking to recover approximately US$1 billion in allegedly fraudulent transfers brought against various transferees as part of the Boston Generating Chapter 11 case.

No, says the Delaware Bankruptcy Court in In re Maxus Energy Corp. In Maxus, the defendant, Vista Analytical Laboratory, Inc. (“Vista” or the “Defendant”), a designated critical vendor, sought summary judgement dismissing the preference complaint. The Court denied summary judgement finding that the critical vendor status did not per se insulate Vista from preference actions.

Background

It is well established that by filing a proof of claim in bankruptcy, a creditor submits itself to the equitable jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court and waives any right it would otherwise have to a jury trial with respect to any issue that “bears directly on the allowance of its claim.” Such a waiver normally applies in fraudulent transfer actions, since under Section 502(d) of the Bankruptcy Code the court must disallow a claim of any entity that received an avoidable transfer.

In a recent bench ruling, the Delaware bankruptcy court denied a motion to dismiss a chapter 11 bankruptcy filing, notwithstanding the fact that the filing contravened an express bankruptcy-filing blocking right, or “golden share,” held by certain preferred shareholders.

Two courts recently answered “yes,” finding that environmental claims brought against reorganized debtors by government entities were discharged under confirmed Chapter 11 plans of reorganization. In In re Exide Techs., 613 B.R. 79 (D. Del. 2020), the District of Delaware held that pre-petition, non-compensatory air quality penalties imposed on a Chapter 11 debtor by a state regulator were subject to discharge in bankruptcy. And in In re Peabody Energy Corp.

I.Exide Techs.: the Bankruptcy Code’s Exceptions to Dischargeability

Yes, says the First Circuit. The First Circuit recently affirmed the District Court’s decision to deny a group of bondholders’ (the “Bondholders”) motion to have a trustee appointed for the Employees Retirement System of the Government of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico (the “System”) under section 926 of the Bankruptcy Code. Section 926 of the Bankruptcy Code allows a court to appoint a trustee to pursue avoidance actions in Chapter 9 cases.

Disagreeing with the much-critiqued SDNY opinion in Enron, the SDNY bankruptcy court disallowed claims brought by secondary transferees because the original claimants allegedly received millions of dollars in fraudulent transfers and preferences from the Debtors that have not been repaid. Deepening the district spilt on the nature of Section 502(d) of the Bankruptcy Code, the Court held that the defense barring fraudulent transfer-tainted claims focuses on claims—not claimants—and cannot be “washed clean” by a subsequent transfer in the secondary market.

受OPEC与俄罗斯减产谈判进展及后续措施影响，3月9日开市以来原油价格强劲下行，连带其他相关大宗商品价格以同样惊人的幅度大幅下跌，朋友圈纷纷感叹“活久见”。2020年初的黑天鹅接踵而至，很难判断下一站的走势到底在哪，也难判断对国内期货等金融市场的传导究竟会到何种程度。在这个价格剧烈波动的日子，人们耳边又回响起华尔街故老相传的”Bulls make money, bears make money, pigs get slaughtered” 的残酷谚语。在目前中国境内证券期货市场中，和做空手段相对有限的股票市场相比，期货市场天然的多头-空头交易机制可以更直观的展现这句话的涵义。

1、当我们在谈论“强行平仓”和“三板强平”时，我在谈些什么？

期货交易的亏损并不仅指强行平仓带来的损失，但是面对如此惊人的市场变化，“爆仓”、“强行平仓”和“三板强平”这类期货术语或行话还是最让人屏住呼吸的字眼。与肾上腺素飙升，杀伐决断的Trader们以及或焦虑或欣慰的相关企业的关注点不同，作为律师的我们，视线停在了这些期货术语或行话背后的基础法律关系上。从机制本身出发：