Recently, in In re Tribune Company, the Third Circuit affirmed that the Bankruptcy Code means exactly what it says and that the enforcement of subordination agreements can be abridged when cramming down confirmation of a chapter 11 plan over a rejecting class entitled to the benefit of the subordination agreement, so long as doing so does not “unfairly discriminate” against the rejecting class (and the other requirements for a cramdown are satisfied).

本文主要讨论公司型基金、合伙型基金自行清算的主要流程，并就基金自行清算出现僵局等情形时，如何申请法院启动基金强制清算程序的主要问题作初步探讨。

基金清算适用的法律

对于公司型基金的清算，其主要适用《公司法》以及《最高人民法院关于适用＜中华人民共和国公司法＞若干问题的规定（二）》（下称“《公司法司法解释二》”）《关于审理公司强制清算案件工作座谈会纪要》（下称“《强制清算纪要》”）以及部分高院出台的相关审判指导。

对于合伙型基金的清算，除适用《合伙企业法》外，可参照公司法律的有关规定。对此，《民法总则》第一百零八条规定，“非法人组织除适用本章规定外，参照适用本编第三章第一节的有关规定”；第三编第一节对法人清算作出了相关规定，其中第七十一条规定，“法人的清算程序和清算组职权，依照有关法律的规定；没有规定的，参照适用公司法律的有关规定”。例如，北京一中院在（2020）京01清申27号《民事裁定书》中基于上述规定，认定合伙型基金的清算应当参照《公司法》的相关规定进行。

除前述规定外，中国证监会、中基协的相关规定，以及其他行业自治组织的相关规定，亦可作为基金清算的依据。

Analyzing the inner workings of the elements required for the securities contract “safe harbor” protection under Section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code, the Bankruptcy Court for the SDNY dismissed a complaint seeking to recover approximately US$1 billion in allegedly fraudulent transfers brought against various transferees as part of the Boston Generating Chapter 11 case.

No, says the Delaware Bankruptcy Court in In re Maxus Energy Corp. In Maxus, the defendant, Vista Analytical Laboratory, Inc. (“Vista” or the “Defendant”), a designated critical vendor, sought summary judgement dismissing the preference complaint. The Court denied summary judgement finding that the critical vendor status did not per se insulate Vista from preference actions.

Background

It is well established that by filing a proof of claim in bankruptcy, a creditor submits itself to the equitable jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court and waives any right it would otherwise have to a jury trial with respect to any issue that “bears directly on the allowance of its claim.” Such a waiver normally applies in fraudulent transfer actions, since under Section 502(d) of the Bankruptcy Code the court must disallow a claim of any entity that received an avoidable transfer.

In a recent bench ruling, the Delaware bankruptcy court denied a motion to dismiss a chapter 11 bankruptcy filing, notwithstanding the fact that the filing contravened an express bankruptcy-filing blocking right, or “golden share,” held by certain preferred shareholders.

Two courts recently answered “yes,” finding that environmental claims brought against reorganized debtors by government entities were discharged under confirmed Chapter 11 plans of reorganization. In In re Exide Techs., 613 B.R. 79 (D. Del. 2020), the District of Delaware held that pre-petition, non-compensatory air quality penalties imposed on a Chapter 11 debtor by a state regulator were subject to discharge in bankruptcy. And in In re Peabody Energy Corp.

I.Exide Techs.: the Bankruptcy Code’s Exceptions to Dischargeability

Yes, says the First Circuit. The First Circuit recently affirmed the District Court’s decision to deny a group of bondholders’ (the “Bondholders”) motion to have a trustee appointed for the Employees Retirement System of the Government of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico (the “System”) under section 926 of the Bankruptcy Code. Section 926 of the Bankruptcy Code allows a court to appoint a trustee to pursue avoidance actions in Chapter 9 cases.

Disagreeing with the much-critiqued SDNY opinion in Enron, the SDNY bankruptcy court disallowed claims brought by secondary transferees because the original claimants allegedly received millions of dollars in fraudulent transfers and preferences from the Debtors that have not been repaid. Deepening the district spilt on the nature of Section 502(d) of the Bankruptcy Code, the Court held that the defense barring fraudulent transfer-tainted claims focuses on claims—not claimants—and cannot be “washed clean” by a subsequent transfer in the secondary market.

Confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan generally requires the consent of each impaired class of creditors. A debtor can “cramdown” a plan over creditor dissent, however, as long as at least one class of impaired claims accepts the plan.