A recent decision of the New York Court of Appeals, Sutton v. Pilevsky held that federal bankruptcy law does not preempt state law tortious interference claims against non-debtors who participated in a scheme that caused a debtor—in this case a bankruptcy remote special purpose entity—to breach contractual obligations intended to ensure that the entity remains a Special Purpose Entity (SPE) and to facilitate the lenders’ enforcement of remedies upon a future bankruptcy filing, if any.

Background

Following our previous alert here on Justice Middleton’s decision in Wells Fargo Trust Company, National Association (trustee) v VB Leaseco Pty Ltd (Administrators Appointed),[1] the administra

Dischargeable Claims

On September 29, 2020, the United States House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary advanced a Democrat-backed bill to the full chamber that seeks to address perceived shortcomings in the Bankruptcy Code’s protections for employee and retiree benefits and to curtail the use of bonuses and special compensation arrangements for executives in bankruptcy cases.

On 14 May 2015, Australia acceded to the Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment (“Cape Town Convention”) and the Protocol to the Cape Town Convention (“Cape Town Protocol”). In particular, for insolvency related proceedings, Australia adopted what is known as “Alternative A” in aviation industry speak. The Cape Town Convention became effective as Australian law on 1 September 2015 and applies to the relevant aviation leasing and financing transitions entered into after that date.

Recently, in In re Tribune Company, the Third Circuit affirmed that the Bankruptcy Code means exactly what it says and that the enforcement of subordination agreements can be abridged when cramming down confirmation of a chapter 11 plan over a rejecting class entitled to the benefit of the subordination agreement, so long as doing so does not “unfairly discriminate” against the rejecting class (and the other requirements for a cramdown are satisfied).

Analyzing the inner workings of the elements required for the securities contract “safe harbor” protection under Section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code, the Bankruptcy Court for the SDNY dismissed a complaint seeking to recover approximately US$1 billion in allegedly fraudulent transfers brought against various transferees as part of the Boston Generating Chapter 11 case.

No, says the Delaware Bankruptcy Court in In re Maxus Energy Corp. In Maxus, the defendant, Vista Analytical Laboratory, Inc. (“Vista” or the “Defendant”), a designated critical vendor, sought summary judgement dismissing the preference complaint. The Court denied summary judgement finding that the critical vendor status did not per se insulate Vista from preference actions.

Background

It is well established that by filing a proof of claim in bankruptcy, a creditor submits itself to the equitable jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court and waives any right it would otherwise have to a jury trial with respect to any issue that “bears directly on the allowance of its claim.” Such a waiver normally applies in fraudulent transfer actions, since under Section 502(d) of the Bankruptcy Code the court must disallow a claim of any entity that received an avoidable transfer.