Summary: In EPC Constructions India Ltd. v. Matix Fertilizers & Chemicals Ltd., the Supreme Court addressed whether holders of non-cumulative redeemable preference shares can initiate insolvency proceedings under Section 7 of the IBC, as financial creditors. The Court held that preference shareholders are not creditors and cannot trigger insolvency proceedings, as preference shares remain part of the share capital even upon maturity, and conversion of debt into preference shares permanently extinguishes the original creditor relationship.

The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (“IBC”), was enacted to inter alia provide a consolidated framework to resolve insolvency in a time-bound manner and to maximise the value of assets. This objective is further aided by a moratorium under Section 14 that halts legal proceedings against the corporate debtor, and the immunity provision under Section 32A, which offers a fresh slate to resolution applicants upon plan approval.

Introduction

For initiating proceedings under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 2016 (“IBC”), categorisation of a creditor as either a “financial creditor” or an “operational creditor” is a rather significant first step. Such categorisation is not merely organisational, but essential since the rights, obligations and procedural requirements for realisation of debt by financial and operational creditors also differ under the IBC.

Two recent cases out of the Third Circuit and the Southern District of New York highlight some of the developing formulas US courts are using when engaging with foreign debtors. In a case out of the Third Circuit, Vertivv. Wayne Burt, the court expanded on factors to be considered when deciding whether international comity requires the dismissal of US civil claims that impact foreign insolvency proceedings.

When a majority of a company’s board approves a tender offer in good faith, can it still be avoided as an actually fraudulent transfer? Yes, says the Delaware Bankruptcy Court, holding that the fraudulent intent of a corporation’s CEO who was a board member and exercised control over the board can be imputed to the corporation, even if he was the sole actor with fraudulent intent.

Background

Recently, in In re Moon Group Inc., a bankruptcy court said no, but the district court, which has agreed to review the decision on an interlocutory appeal, seems far less sure.

Yes, says the Delaware Bankruptcy Court in the case of CII Parent, Inc., cementing the advice routinely given by bankruptcy counsel to borrowers in default. We always counsel borrower clients in default of the risk associated with lenders taking unilateral actions pre-filing, stripping debtors of valuable options and assets. Thus, we normally recommend to always obtain a forbearance and undertake the preparations required to file a bankruptcy petition immediately upon forbearance termination, although whether or not to file depends on variety of factors that should be considered.

The Second Circuit recently held that a non-party to an assumed executory contract is not entitled to a cure payment (although it may be so entitled if is a third-party beneficiary of the contract). The result would have seemed obvious to bankruptcy practitioners. So, what in the world made the party pursuing payment take this to the Second Circuit? Well, surprisingly, as the Second Circuit decision shows, the answer is not found in the plain text of the Bankruptcy Code. And while it was argued prior to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Bartenwerfer v. Buckley, No. 21-908, 598 U.S.

A mortgage loan repurchase facility (more casually referred to as a "repo") is a financing structure commonly utilized to finance mortgage loans. These facilities are utilized by both residential and commercial mortgage loan originators and aggregators to finance mortgage loans that they originate or acquire. The structure is favored by liquidity providers in the mortgage loan finance arena due to its preferential "safe harbor" treatment under the United States Bankruptcy Code (the "Bankruptcy Code"), as further described below.

Lenders often attempt to limit what a borrower can do outside the ordinary course of business by negotiating contractual protections. Some of these provisions are designed to make the borrowers bankruptcy remote by, for example, requiring the borrower’s Board to include an independent director whose consent is required for a bankruptcy filing. Others, as was the case we discuss here, however, go further by including contractual rights that limit a borrower’s ability to file for bankruptcy without the lender’s consent.