Prior to the introduction of the Preventive Restructuring Framework by the StaRUG out-of-court restructurings in Germany other than the restructuring of German law-governed bonds generally required unanimous approval by all affected creditors. Existing in-court procedures were only available in case of insolvency, and entailed substantial court involvement.

The economic shock and disruption caused by the outbreak of the SARS-CoV-2-Virus (COVID-19-pandemic) resulted in unprecedented circumstances for companies and prompted recent emergency rescue measures by the German legislator. In the following, we are highlighting two major legislative measures that will come into force in the next few days.

Legislative changes to mitigate the consequences of the COVID-19-pandemic with respect to specific contract, corporate, insolvency and criminal law matters (the “COVInsAG”)

Last Friday, in response to the outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic (COVID-19), the German government announced various measures described as a big "bazooka" to avert a crisis in the Eurozone's largest economy. The German development bank KfW will play a key role in the context of the announced measures and has been tasked to provide liquidity assistance to German companies hit by the pandemic.

It has long been the law that creditors are rarely entitled to contractually prohibit a debtor from filing for bankruptcy, whether such restriction is contained in the debt instruments or in the corporate governance documents. In contrast, governance provisions which condition a bankruptcy filing on the vote or consent of certain equity holders that are unaffiliated with any creditor are frequently enforced. Many equity sponsors, for example, wear two hats: they are both shareholders and lenders to their portfolio companies.

On 28 November 2016 the German Federal Fiscal Court (FFC) (GrS BFH 1/15, published on 8 February 2017) held that the guidance on a reorganisation tax privilege (Reorganization Decree (Sanierungserlass)) issued by the German Federal Ministry of Finance (FMF) in 2003 was invalid. The ruling has created great uncertainty for the restructuring practice in Germany regarding the proper tax treatment of restructuring gains.

In its April 2018 decision, the BGH ruled on the question whether the directors of a company that has been granted debtor in possession status by the respective insolvency court can become personally liable for a breach of a duty of care vis-à-vis the creditors like an insolvency administrator. The underlying legal question was the subject of a controversial academic discussion in the past.

In Nortel Networks, Inc., Case No. 09-0138(KG), Doc. No. 18001 (March 8, 2017), the Delaware Bankruptcy Court ruled on the objections of two noteholders who asked the Court to disallow more than $4.4 million of the $8.1 million of the fees sought by counsel to their indenture trustee. Given the detailed rulings announced by the Court, the decision may establish a number of guidelines by which future fee requests made by an indenture trustee’s professionals will be measured.

Matters Handled by the UCC

A recent judgment of the German Federal Fiscal Court (FFC) will have significant impact on the restructuring tool kit afforded under German law. The FFC has found that the existing practice of permitting a tax liability arising from restructuring gains to be deferred and (eventually) waived violates fundamental principles of German law. The ruling has created uncertainty regarding the proper tax treatment of restructuring gains, which may have the effect of diminishing the prospect of success of a restructuring for a company in financial distress.

“The question that he frames in all but words

Is what to make of a diminished thing.”

                             Robert Frost, “The Oven Bird”

In a significant expansion of the potential risk for distressed claims traders, the Delaware bankruptcy court has recently ruled¹ that traders who engage in insider trading may have their claims subordinated to equity, and that traders who amass claims sufficient to block a plan of reorganization owe fiduciary duties to all other creditors and shareholders during plan negotiations.