Are the courts of England and Wales establishing themselves as a flexible forum for cross-border enforceability? Here, we consider this question in light of two recent High Court decisions: Re Silverpail Dairy (Ireland) Unlimited Co. [2023] EWHC 895 (Ch) (Silverpail) and Invest Bank PSC v El-Husseini & Ors [2023] EWHC 2302 (Comm) (Invest Bank).

On Sunday, March 12th, the Treasury Department, the FDIC, and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Fed) (the Agencies) announced that the New York Department of Financial Services had appointed the FDIC as receiver for Signature Bank, which was closed on March 11th.  Subsequently, the FDIC announced that it had transferred substantially all of the assets and all of the deposits of Signature Bank to the newly created Signature Bridge Bank, N.A.  Early on March 13th, the FDIC announced a similar transfer of assets and deposits to Silicon Valley Bank, N.A., another n

In October 2022, the English High Court delivered a long-awaited judgment¹ relating to whether or not certain Bankruptcy Events of Default can be cured under the ISDA 2002 and 1992 Master Agreements ("ISDA Master Agreements") - resolving an issue relating to the suspensory effect of conditions precedent to payments and performance under ISDA Master Agreements raised in the English Court of Appeal earlier in the Lehman administration.

In bankruptcy as in federal jurisprudence generally, to characterize something with the near-epithet of “federal common law” virtually dooms it to rejection.

In January 2020 we reported that, after the reconsideration suggested by two Supreme Court justices and revisions to account for the Supreme Court’s Merit Management decision,[1] the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stood by its origina

It seems to be a common misunderstanding, even among lawyers who are not bankruptcy lawyers, that litigation in federal bankruptcy court consists largely or even exclusively of disputes about the avoidance of transactions as preferential or fraudulent, the allowance of claims and the confirmation of plans of reorganization. However, with a jurisdictional reach that encompasses “all civil proceedings . . .

I don’t know if Congress foresaw, when it enacted new Subchapter V of Chapter 11 of the Code[1] in the Small Business Reorganization Act of 2019 (“SBRA”), that debtors in pending cases would seek to convert or redesignate their cases as Subchapter V cases when SBRA became effective on February 19, 2020, but it was foreseeable.

Our February 26 post [1] reported on the first case dealing with the question whether a debtor in a pending Chapter 11 case may redesignate it as a case under Subchapter V, [2] the new subchapter of Chapter 11 adopted by the Small Business Reorganization Act of 2019 (“SBRA”), which became effective on February 19.

Our February 26 post entitled “SBRA Springs to Life”^[1] reported on the first case known to me that dealt with the issue whether a debtor in a pending Chapter 11 case should be permitted to amend its petition to designate it as a case under Subchapter V,^[2] the new subchapter of Chapter 11 adopted by

State governments can be creditors of individuals, businesses and institutions that are debtors in bankruptcy in a variety of ways, most notably as tax and fine collectors but also as lenders. They can also be debtors of debtors, in their role, for example, as the purchasers of vast quantities of goods and services on credit. And they can also be transferees of a debtor’s property in (at least) every role in which they can be creditors.