Of particular interest to commercial landlords, the recent decision of the court in SBP 2 SARL v 2 Southbank Tenant Ltd [2025]EWHC 16 (Ch) illustrates the risks to a landlord of simply cross-referring to Section 123 of the Insolvency Act 1986 (respectively, Section 123 and the 1986 Act) in the forfeiture provisions of a lease without specifying any amendments to the statutory language and thereby provides a reminder of the importance of careful and accurate drafting.

On Tuesday 23 April 2024, Macfarlanes hosted a roundtable discussion on the EU Directive on Restructuring and Insolvency of 20 June 2019 (EUR 2019/1023, Directive) and the method of, and tools offered by, its implementation across a number of EU member states and equivalent domestic legislation – namely Part 26A of the Companies Act 2006 (Part 26A) and restructuring plans (for more on restructuring plans under Part 26A of the Companies Act 2006, see our more in-depth article on “

The court orders a disqualified director of an insolvent company to pay personal compensation to creditors.

This is only the second time the courts have considered a personal compensation order against a disqualified director since their introduction in 2015.

What happened?

Secretary of State v Barnsby [2023] EWHC 2284 (Ch) concerned an individual who was the sole director and majority shareholder of a company that sold package holidays.

Payment Orders were originally introduced in the CPC as a fast track route for creditors holding a financial instrument, such as a letter of credit or cheque, to obtain judgment against their debtor for what is a simple and indisputable debt. Payment Orders were rarely issued by the onshore UAE courts. In 2018, Cabinet Resolution No 57 of 2018 (the “2018 Cabinet Resolution”) significantly expanded the scope of application of Payment Orders by extending them to all admitted debts rather than simply those arising out of financial instruments only.

Despite the economic disruption of Covid-19 and resulting lockdowns, the number of formal insolvencies has been remarkably low.

In bankruptcy as in federal jurisprudence generally, to characterize something with the near-epithet of “federal common law” virtually dooms it to rejection.

Three weeks spent entirely at home seemed daunting at the time (little did we know…) and the prospect of wholesale business closures soon gave rise to serious concerns about the potential impact which those closures would have on the wider economy.

In January 2020 we reported that, after the reconsideration suggested by two Supreme Court justices and revisions to account for the Supreme Court’s Merit Management decision,[1] the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stood by its origina

It seems to be a common misunderstanding, even among lawyers who are not bankruptcy lawyers, that litigation in federal bankruptcy court consists largely or even exclusively of disputes about the avoidance of transactions as preferential or fraudulent, the allowance of claims and the confirmation of plans of reorganization. However, with a jurisdictional reach that encompasses “all civil proceedings . . .

I don’t know if Congress foresaw, when it enacted new Subchapter V of Chapter 11 of the Code[1] in the Small Business Reorganization Act of 2019 (“SBRA”), that debtors in pending cases would seek to convert or redesignate their cases as Subchapter V cases when SBRA became effective on February 19, 2020, but it was foreseeable.