Back in the day--say, the last two decades of the twentieth century--we bankruptcy lawyers took it largely on faith that the right structural and contractual provisions purporting to confer bankruptcy-remoteness[1] were enforceable and likely to be successful in preventing an entity from becoming, voluntarily or involuntarily, a debtor under the Bankruptcy Code.

A long-running issue concerning the treatment of trademark licenses in bankruptcy has seen a new milestone with the January 12 decision of the First Circuit in Mission Product Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC.[1] The issue was implicit in the Bankruptcy Code from the time of its adoption in 1978 and flared into the open with the decision of the Fourth Circuit in Lubrizol Enterprises, Inc. v.

When the fallout from failed intellectual-property litigation collides with bankruptcy, the complexities may be dizzying enough, but when the emerging practices and imperatives of litigation financing are imposed on those complexities, the situation might be likened to three-dimensional chess. But in the court of one veteran bankruptcy judge, the complexities were penetrated to reveal that elementary errors and oversights can have decisive effects.

It is a unique characteristic of debt restructuring under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code that a majority of a class of creditors can accept a modification of the terms of the debts owed to the class members, as provided in a plan of reorganization, and thereby bind non-accepting class members.[1] The ordinary route to confirming a Chapter 11 plan is to obtain its acceptance by a majority of every impaired class of creditors and equity hold

Avoiding a fraudulent transfer to the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) in bankruptcy has become easier, or at least clearer, as a result of a recent unanimous decision by a panel of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Zazzali v. United States (In re DBSI, Inc.), 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 16817 (9th Cir. Aug. 31, 2017).

The long-running litigation spawned by the leveraged buyout of Tribune Company, which closed in December 2007, and the subsequent bankruptcy case commenced on December 8, 2008[1] has challenged the maxim that “there’s nothing new under the sun” even for this writer with four decades of bankruptcy practice behind him.

On May 3, 2017, the Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico filed a voluntary petition for relief on behalf of Puerto Rico in federal court there. The filing required the Chief Justice of the United States to designate a district court judge to conduct the case. On May 5, Chief Justice Roberts appointed District Judge Laura Taylor Swain of the Southern District of New York. Judge Swain was a bankruptcy judge in the Eastern District of New York before joining the district court in 2000.

It should be common knowledge that a secured creditor, having received proper notice in a Chapter 11 bankruptcy case, faces the risk that its lien will be extinguished if it fails to object to a reorganization plan that does not specifically preserve the lien. Apparently, however, not all secured lenders realize this risk, and some fall prey to a trap for the unwary in §1141(c) of the Bankruptcy Code by failing to protect their liens and place their collateral at risk.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (the "Second Circuit") recently affirmed a broad reading of the safe harbor of United States Bankruptcy Code (the "Bankruptcy Code") section 546(e), which protects from avoidance both "margin payments" and "settlement payments" as well as transfers made in connection with a "securities contract." In Quebecor, the Second Circuit affirmed decisions of the bankruptcy and district courts and held that the purchase by Quebecor World (USA) Inc.

On a matter of first impression, the Fourth Circuit issued an opinion in the Derivium Capital, LLC bankruptcy case on May 24, 2013,1 affirming the District Court’s ruling that Grayson Consulting Inc. ("Grayson"), the chapter 7 Trustee’s assignee, could not avoid as fraudulent conveyances Wachovia’s2 commissions, fees, and margin interest payments because those payments were protected from recovery by the safe harbor of United States Bankruptcy Code (the "Bankruptcy Code") section 546(e).