在终审法院最新颁布的 Re Guy Kwok-hung Lam[2023] HKCFA 9突破性裁决中，终审法院驳回了该案的上诉，并且在判词中就专属管辖权条款（EJC）是否对提交破产呈请有影响这一棘手问题作出裁决，平息了长期对于相关议题的争论。

简而言之，终审法院认可上诉法院大多数法官对于本案的观点，认为一般来说，如果呈请债务的基础争议受制于专属管辖权条款，除非有其他反面因素存在（例如债务人破产的风险将会影响第三方、债务人的呈请以几乎无意义的争议为基础，或者发生滥用法律程序的情况等）， 则法院应驳回该破产呈请。

终审法院在裁定中指出，当只有一名债权人提出破产呈请，而没有证据表明全体债权人都面临风险时，破产制度背后的公共政策因素的重要性则显着降低。

这一裁定反映了法院非常重视当事人自治的原则，以及当事人之间自由达成的协议。该判决将会对破产领域产生深远的影响，以及对处理清算及破产呈请中的仲裁条款产生涟漪效应。

In the latest ground breaking decision in Re Guy Kwok-hung Lam[2023] HKCFA 9, the Court of Final Appeal dismissed the appeal and laid to rest a long-standing debate on the vexing question concerning the impact, if any, exclusive jurisdiction clauses (EJCs) have on the presentation of bankruptcy petitions.

In Grant & Ors v FR Acquisitions Corporation (Europe) Ltd & Anor (Re Lehman Brothers International (Europe)) [2022] EWHC 2532 (Ch), the English High Court ruled on an application for directions (the “Application”) made by the administrators (the “Administrators”) of Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (LBIE) relating to the construction and effect of certain bankruptcy-related events of default (“Events of Default”) specified under the ISDA Master Agreements (as defined below), specifically:

In this client alert we set out some of the key lessons from the recent judgment in ABT Auto Investments Ltd v Aapico Investment Pte Ltd [2022] EWHC 2839 (Comm), which considers the validity of appropriation as an enforcement power pursuant to Regulation 17 of the Financial Collateral Arrangements (No. 2) Regulations 2003 (“FCARs”), the duty imposed on a collateral-taker by Regulation 18 of the FCARs in connection with the valuation of a collateral subject to appropriation, and provides useful guidance on what is “commercially reasonable” in this context.

Where a creditor’s bankruptcy petition is presented in Hong Kong, should it be allowed to proceed if the petition debt, which the debtor disputes, arises from an agreement which contains an exclusive jurisdiction clause in favour of a foreign court?

In bankruptcy as in federal jurisprudence generally, to characterize something with the near-epithet of “federal common law” virtually dooms it to rejection.

In January 2020 we reported that, after the reconsideration suggested by two Supreme Court justices and revisions to account for the Supreme Court’s Merit Management decision,[1] the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stood by its origina

It seems to be a common misunderstanding, even among lawyers who are not bankruptcy lawyers, that litigation in federal bankruptcy court consists largely or even exclusively of disputes about the avoidance of transactions as preferential or fraudulent, the allowance of claims and the confirmation of plans of reorganization. However, with a jurisdictional reach that encompasses “all civil proceedings . . .

I don’t know if Congress foresaw, when it enacted new Subchapter V of Chapter 11 of the Code[1] in the Small Business Reorganization Act of 2019 (“SBRA”), that debtors in pending cases would seek to convert or redesignate their cases as Subchapter V cases when SBRA became effective on February 19, 2020, but it was foreseeable.

Our February 26 post [1] reported on the first case dealing with the question whether a debtor in a pending Chapter 11 case may redesignate it as a case under Subchapter V, [2] the new subchapter of Chapter 11 adopted by the Small Business Reorganization Act of 2019 (“SBRA”), which became effective on February 19.