In a recent decision, the German Federal Court of Justice (BGH) further outlined the requirements for the avoidance of a transaction under insolvency law on the grounds of wilful disadvantage to creditors pursuant to section 133 of the German Insolvency Code (InsO).

Background

Background

Under German insolvency law, employees are generally protected from claw-back claims. The payment of wages is considered a "cash transaction" if the employer pays the salary within three months of the work being performed. A “cash transaction” can only be contested in limited circumstances. Where a third party pays the salary, the cash transaction privilege remains if it is not clear to the employee that a third party made the payment (s.142(2) and s.3 InsO).

A recent German Federal Court of Justice ruling shows that this protection has limits.

The German court has published LG München I v. 13.07.2021 - 6 O 17571/20 – the first published ruling on COVInsAG. We unpack the key takeaways from the decision below.

Background

To mitigate the economic effects of the pandemic, the German government passed the COVID-19 Insolvency Suspension Act (COVInsAG) to temporarily suspend the obligation on directors to file for insolvency where the debtor's insolvency was due to the pandemic. The COVInsAG (Section 2(1) Nos.2 and 4) also suspends large parts of the rules on insolvency avoidance.

In bankruptcy as in federal jurisprudence generally, to characterize something with the near-epithet of “federal common law” virtually dooms it to rejection.

In January 2020 we reported that, after the reconsideration suggested by two Supreme Court justices and revisions to account for the Supreme Court’s Merit Management decision,[1] the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stood by its origina

It seems to be a common misunderstanding, even among lawyers who are not bankruptcy lawyers, that litigation in federal bankruptcy court consists largely or even exclusively of disputes about the avoidance of transactions as preferential or fraudulent, the allowance of claims and the confirmation of plans of reorganization. However, with a jurisdictional reach that encompasses “all civil proceedings . . .

I don’t know if Congress foresaw, when it enacted new Subchapter V of Chapter 11 of the Code[1] in the Small Business Reorganization Act of 2019 (“SBRA”), that debtors in pending cases would seek to convert or redesignate their cases as Subchapter V cases when SBRA became effective on February 19, 2020, but it was foreseeable.

Our February 26 post [1] reported on the first case dealing with the question whether a debtor in a pending Chapter 11 case may redesignate it as a case under Subchapter V, [2] the new subchapter of Chapter 11 adopted by the Small Business Reorganization Act of 2019 (“SBRA”), which became effective on February 19.

Our February 26 post entitled “SBRA Springs to Life”^[1] reported on the first case known to me that dealt with the issue whether a debtor in a pending Chapter 11 case should be permitted to amend its petition to designate it as a case under Subchapter V,^[2] the new subchapter of Chapter 11 adopted by

State governments can be creditors of individuals, businesses and institutions that are debtors in bankruptcy in a variety of ways, most notably as tax and fine collectors but also as lenders. They can also be debtors of debtors, in their role, for example, as the purchasers of vast quantities of goods and services on credit. And they can also be transferees of a debtor’s property in (at least) every role in which they can be creditors.