Should a corporation be affixed with the fraudulent or other nefarious intent of its directing minds? The answer to this question is of key importance in several contexts where the “intent” of the corporation leads to specific legal consequences.

L’arbitrage est un mode consensuel de résolution des différends qui permet aux parties de personnaliser leur processus et même de choisir leur propre décideur. L’insolvabilité est le scénario diamétralement opposé, dans lequel les différends concernant le débiteur sont involontairement regroupés devant un seul tribunal d’insolvabilité.

Arbitration is a consensual method of dispute resolution in which the parties can customize their process and even select their own decision-maker. Insolvency is the diametrically opposite scenario, where disputes involving the debtor are involuntarily consolidated before a single insolvency court.

In bankruptcy as in federal jurisprudence generally, to characterize something with the near-epithet of “federal common law” virtually dooms it to rejection.

In January 2020 we reported that, after the reconsideration suggested by two Supreme Court justices and revisions to account for the Supreme Court’s Merit Management decision,[1] the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stood by its origina

It seems to be a common misunderstanding, even among lawyers who are not bankruptcy lawyers, that litigation in federal bankruptcy court consists largely or even exclusively of disputes about the avoidance of transactions as preferential or fraudulent, the allowance of claims and the confirmation of plans of reorganization. However, with a jurisdictional reach that encompasses “all civil proceedings . . .

In Chandos Construction Ltd. v Deloitte Restructuring Inc., the Supreme Court of Canada confirmed the application of the common law anti-deprivation rule in the context of a Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA) proceeding.

I don’t know if Congress foresaw, when it enacted new Subchapter V of Chapter 11 of the Code[1] in the Small Business Reorganization Act of 2019 (“SBRA”), that debtors in pending cases would seek to convert or redesignate their cases as Subchapter V cases when SBRA became effective on February 19, 2020, but it was foreseeable.

Our February 26 post [1] reported on the first case dealing with the question whether a debtor in a pending Chapter 11 case may redesignate it as a case under Subchapter V, [2] the new subchapter of Chapter 11 adopted by the Small Business Reorganization Act of 2019 (“SBRA”), which became effective on February 19.

Our February 26 post entitled “SBRA Springs to Life”^[1] reported on the first case known to me that dealt with the issue whether a debtor in a pending Chapter 11 case should be permitted to amend its petition to designate it as a case under Subchapter V,^[2] the new subchapter of Chapter 11 adopted by