The Second Circuit recently held that a non-party to an assumed executory contract is not entitled to a cure payment (although it may be so entitled if is a third-party beneficiary of the contract). The result would have seemed obvious to bankruptcy practitioners. So, what in the world made the party pursuing payment take this to the Second Circuit? Well, surprisingly, as the Second Circuit decision shows, the answer is not found in the plain text of the Bankruptcy Code. And while it was argued prior to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Bartenwerfer v. Buckley, No. 21-908, 598 U.S.

A mortgage loan repurchase facility (more casually referred to as a "repo") is a financing structure commonly utilized to finance mortgage loans. These facilities are utilized by both residential and commercial mortgage loan originators and aggregators to finance mortgage loans that they originate or acquire. The structure is favored by liquidity providers in the mortgage loan finance arena due to its preferential "safe harbor" treatment under the United States Bankruptcy Code (the "Bankruptcy Code"), as further described below.

We have previously blogged about Bartenwerfer v. Buckley, No. 21-908, a Supreme Court case concerning the scope of the fraud exception to the dischargeability of debts in bankruptcy. Section 523 of the Bankruptcy Code exempts from discharge “any debt . . . for money, property, services, or an extension, renewal, or refinancing of credit, to the extent obtained by . . .

Lenders often attempt to limit what a borrower can do outside the ordinary course of business by negotiating contractual protections. Some of these provisions are designed to make the borrowers bankruptcy remote by, for example, requiring the borrower’s Board to include an independent director whose consent is required for a bankruptcy filing. Others, as was the case we discuss here, however, go further by including contractual rights that limit a borrower’s ability to file for bankruptcy without the lender’s consent.

On Sunday, March 12th, the Treasury Department, the FDIC, and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Fed) (the Agencies) announced that the New York Department of Financial Services had appointed the FDIC as receiver for Signature Bank, which was closed on March 11th.  Subsequently, the FDIC announced that it had transferred substantially all of the assets and all of the deposits of Signature Bank to the newly created Signature Bridge Bank, N.A.  Early on March 13th, the FDIC announced a similar transfer of assets and deposits to Silicon Valley Bank, N.A., another n

In the Chapter 15 case of Three Arrows Capital, Ltd., the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York recently held that Rule 45 of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule 45”) authorizes service of subpoenas to U.S. nationals or residents who are in a foreign country through alternative means to personal service, including via email and Twitter.

The concept of “property of the estate” is important in bankruptcy because it determines what property can be used or distributed for the benefit of the debtor’s creditors. Defined by section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code, “property of the estate” broadly encompasses the debtor’s interests in property, with certain additions and exceptions provided for in the Code. See 11 U.S.C. § 541. Difficult questions can arise in a contractual relationship between a debtor and a counterparty about whether an entity actually owns a particular asset or merely has some contractual right.

Under Section 101(54) of the bankruptcy code, any means of disposing with an interest in property is considered a transfer, and therefore, under certain circumstances, may be avoided as a preference or fraudulent transfer. In a recent unpublished opinion, the Third Circuit addressed the scope of the provisions. The Third Circuit recently held that prepetition lease termination did not give rise to a transfer.

Background

Section 303(i) of the Bankruptcy Code authorizes the court to award the debtor sanctions on account of an improper filing of an involuntary petition against it. But can a non-debtor third-party obtain such a relief? Yes, says the Bankruptcy Court In In re Vascular Access Centers, L.P., No. 19-17117 (AMC), 2022 WL 17366463 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Dec. 1, 2022).

Background

We have previously blogged about Siegel v. Fitzgerald, the Supreme Court decision last June that invalidated the 2018 difference in fees between bankruptcy cases filed in Bankruptcy Administrator judicial districts and U.S. Trustee judicial districts.