In Harrington v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 144 S. Ct. 2071 (2024) (“Purdue”), the Supreme Court held that the Bankruptcy Code does not authorize nonconsensual releases of nondebtors as part of a chapter 11 plan. The Court narrowly read the Code’s language, providing that a plan may “include any other appropriate provision not inconsistent with the applicable provisions of this title,” 11 U.S.C.

We have previouslyblogged about the section 546(e) defense to a trustee’s avoidance powers under the Bankruptcy Code. A trustee has broad powers to set aside certain transfers made by debtors before bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 547, 548.

We have previously blogged about the section 546(e) defense to a trustee’s avoidance powers under the Bankruptcy Code. A trustee has broad powers to set aside certain transfers made by debtors before bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 547, 548. Section 546(e), however, bars avoiding certain transfers, including a “settlement payment . . . made by or to (or for the benefit of) . . . a financial institution [or] a transfer made by or to (or for the benefit of) a . . . financial institution . . . in connection with a securities contract.” 11 U.S.C. § 546(e).

Federal law assigns to U.S. district courts original jurisdiction over all cases under Title 11 (the Bankruptcy Code) and all civil proceedings arising under Title 11 or arising in or relating to Title 11. See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a), (b). Federal law permits each U.S. district court to refer such cases and civil proceedings to bankruptcy courts, and district courts generally do so. But bankruptcy courts, unlike district courts, are not courts under Article III of the Constitution, and are therefore constrained in what powers they may constitutionally exercise.

Section 544(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code enables a trustee to step into the shoes of a creditor and avoid a transfer “of an interest of the debtor in property” that an unsecured creditor could avoid under applicable state law. See 11 U.S.C. § 544(b)(1). Thus, for example, if outside of bankruptcy a creditor could avoid a transaction entered by a debtor as a fraudulent transfer, in bankruptcy, the trustee acquires the power to avoid such a transaction.

We have blogged a fewtimes about the Supreme Court’s decision in Siegel v. Fitzgerald and its implications.

We have previously blogged about Bartenwerfer v. Buckley, No. 21-908, a Supreme Court case concerning the scope of the fraud exception to the dischargeability of debts in bankruptcy. Section 523 of the Bankruptcy Code exempts from discharge “any debt . . . for money, property, services, or an extension, renewal, or refinancing of credit, to the extent obtained by . . .

The concept of “property of the estate” is important in bankruptcy because it determines what property can be used or distributed for the benefit of the debtor’s creditors. Defined by section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code, “property of the estate” broadly encompasses the debtor’s interests in property, with certain additions and exceptions provided for in the Code. See 11 U.S.C. § 541. Difficult questions can arise in a contractual relationship between a debtor and a counterparty about whether an entity actually owns a particular asset or merely has some contractual right.

We have previously blogged about Siegel v. Fitzgerald, the Supreme Court decision last June that invalidated the 2018 difference in fees between bankruptcy cases filed in Bankruptcy Administrator judicial districts and U.S. Trustee judicial districts.

以物抵债，指债权人与债务人之间存在金钱债务，双方约定将债务人财产作价交付债权人抵偿债务的行为。实践中，主要分为两种类型，包括当事人双方协商的以物抵债和民事强制执行程序中的以物抵债程序，本文仅就前种以物抵债类型进行探讨。

近年来，随着新冠疫情影响，经济形势发生变化，再加上政策调控等多重因素打击，导致地产行业遭遇寒冬，现金流频繁遭受考验。迫于资金回款压力，为了缓解僵局，地产企业推出“工抵房”“内部房”等房源以期减轻对外负债或实现现金回流。其中，“工抵房”也被称为工程抵款房，是开发商用于给工程方抵扣工程款的一种方式，也是大众所俗称以物抵债的一种常见形式。虽然，工程方的需求是现金而并非房屋，但目前经济形势下，工程方面临开发商无款支付的现实局面，只能无奈被迫接受“工抵房”。尽管“工抵房”的出现使得开发商不再面临房子无路销售的难题，同时解决了部分应付款项；工程方能获得部分“工抵房”以解决工程资金被长期拖欠的难题；购房者可以更低价格买到“工抵房”从而降低购房成本，这一循环链看似多赢，实则隐藏大量法律风险。本文将从“工抵房”的角度，以工抵债权人的视角，对以物抵债的性质、模式、法律风险等维度进行分析，以期对实践和后续研究有所贡献。

一、以物抵债协议的性质