In Harrington v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 144 S. Ct. 2071 (2024) (“Purdue”), the Supreme Court held that the Bankruptcy Code does not authorize nonconsensual releases of nondebtors as part of a chapter 11 plan. The Court narrowly read the Code’s language, providing that a plan may “include any other appropriate provision not inconsistent with the applicable provisions of this title,” 11 U.S.C.

We have previouslyblogged about the section 546(e) defense to a trustee’s avoidance powers under the Bankruptcy Code. A trustee has broad powers to set aside certain transfers made by debtors before bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 547, 548.

引子

将于2024年7月1日正式施行的《公司法》（以下简称“新《公司法》”）第二百三十二条对于“清算义务人”及“未及时履行清算义务责任”（以下简称“董事怠于清算责任”）进行了重大修订，无论是股份公司还是有限公司，董事都将成为法定的唯一清算义务人。该条规定的更新无疑将引发司法解释及其他配套规定的新一轮重大修改，并将再次对司法实践中本就争议颇多的怠于清算责任案件的裁判规则带来冲击。

引子

将于2024年7月1日正式施行的《公司法》（以下简称“《新公司法》”）第二百三十二条对于“清算义务人”及“怠于履行清算义务责任”（以下简称“怠于清算责任”）进行了重大修订，无论是股份公司还是有限公司，董事都将成为法定的唯一清算义务人。该条规定的更新无疑将引发司法解释及其他配套规定的新一轮重大修改，并将对司法实践中本就争议颇多的怠于清算责任案件的裁判规则再次带来冲击。

回望我国立法沿革，在超过三十年的时间中，对于“清算义务人”及“怠于清算责任”的规定修订之繁多、体系之冲突、解释之模糊，遍观整个民商事法律体系都属罕见，并由此引发了大量“类案不同判”的现象。鉴此，笔者将结合《新公司法》的最新修改，对涉及“清算义务人”和“怠于清算责任”的规定进行系统回顾及梳理，并以此为基础对《新公司法》的新修亮点及溯及力问题进行初步分析，抛砖引玉，并求教于业界。

一、《新公司法》之前我国法律对于“清算义务人”与“怠于清算责任”的立法沿革

（一）2005年《公司法》修订之前的相关规定

We have previously blogged about the section 546(e) defense to a trustee’s avoidance powers under the Bankruptcy Code. A trustee has broad powers to set aside certain transfers made by debtors before bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 547, 548. Section 546(e), however, bars avoiding certain transfers, including a “settlement payment . . . made by or to (or for the benefit of) . . . a financial institution [or] a transfer made by or to (or for the benefit of) a . . . financial institution . . . in connection with a securities contract.” 11 U.S.C. § 546(e).

Federal law assigns to U.S. district courts original jurisdiction over all cases under Title 11 (the Bankruptcy Code) and all civil proceedings arising under Title 11 or arising in or relating to Title 11. See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a), (b). Federal law permits each U.S. district court to refer such cases and civil proceedings to bankruptcy courts, and district courts generally do so. But bankruptcy courts, unlike district courts, are not courts under Article III of the Constitution, and are therefore constrained in what powers they may constitutionally exercise.

Section 544(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code enables a trustee to step into the shoes of a creditor and avoid a transfer “of an interest of the debtor in property” that an unsecured creditor could avoid under applicable state law. See 11 U.S.C. § 544(b)(1). Thus, for example, if outside of bankruptcy a creditor could avoid a transaction entered by a debtor as a fraudulent transfer, in bankruptcy, the trustee acquires the power to avoid such a transaction.

We have blogged a fewtimes about the Supreme Court’s decision in Siegel v. Fitzgerald and its implications.

We have previously blogged about Bartenwerfer v. Buckley, No. 21-908, a Supreme Court case concerning the scope of the fraud exception to the dischargeability of debts in bankruptcy. Section 523 of the Bankruptcy Code exempts from discharge “any debt . . . for money, property, services, or an extension, renewal, or refinancing of credit, to the extent obtained by . . .

The concept of “property of the estate” is important in bankruptcy because it determines what property can be used or distributed for the benefit of the debtor’s creditors. Defined by section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code, “property of the estate” broadly encompasses the debtor’s interests in property, with certain additions and exceptions provided for in the Code. See 11 U.S.C. § 541. Difficult questions can arise in a contractual relationship between a debtor and a counterparty about whether an entity actually owns a particular asset or merely has some contractual right.