In Harrington v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 144 S. Ct. 2071 (2024) (“Purdue”), the Supreme Court held that the Bankruptcy Code does not authorize nonconsensual releases of nondebtors as part of a chapter 11 plan. The Court narrowly read the Code’s language, providing that a plan may “include any other appropriate provision not inconsistent with the applicable provisions of this title,” 11 U.S.C.

对于陷入困境的企业，可以通过与债权人之间以协议的方式，对企业进行债务调整和资产重构，以实现企业复兴和债务清偿。而债务重组中债权人最关注的即是如何有效地实现债权退出，不同类型的债权人、不同的债权情况所涉的债权人诉求均可能存在差异，提供多样化的债权退出路径可以更有效地促进困境企业债务重组成功。根据实践经验，我们总结出多种卓有成效的债权退出路径，包括但不限于直接参与留债重组、债权转股权、债权转让、资产证券化等等。

一、直接参与留债重组

对于债务人陷入流动性危机，但本身资质良好，给予一定的时间可度过困境恢复清偿能力的，债权人往往愿意与债务人就还款金额、还款方式、还款时间等债权债务问题达成新的协议，通过优化该类企业的资产负债结构、盘活企业不良资产，帮助企业渡过财务危机，最终实现债权受偿。

在留债重组的方式下，债权人亦可以有多种具体的债权退出路径，包括但不限于资产出售及资产盘活偿债、以资产或信托受益权等财产权抵债、以企业经营收益现金受偿、企业恢复良性负债率后融资还债等等。特殊情况下，如相关债权涉及企业继续经营所必需，还可以采取“类共益债”的形式，由全体债权人表决引入投资人协助原债权人退出。

（一）以部分资产出售偿债退出

We have previouslyblogged about the section 546(e) defense to a trustee’s avoidance powers under the Bankruptcy Code. A trustee has broad powers to set aside certain transfers made by debtors before bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 547, 548.

We have previously blogged about the section 546(e) defense to a trustee’s avoidance powers under the Bankruptcy Code. A trustee has broad powers to set aside certain transfers made by debtors before bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 547, 548. Section 546(e), however, bars avoiding certain transfers, including a “settlement payment . . . made by or to (or for the benefit of) . . . a financial institution [or] a transfer made by or to (or for the benefit of) a . . . financial institution . . . in connection with a securities contract.” 11 U.S.C. § 546(e).

Federal law assigns to U.S. district courts original jurisdiction over all cases under Title 11 (the Bankruptcy Code) and all civil proceedings arising under Title 11 or arising in or relating to Title 11. See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a), (b). Federal law permits each U.S. district court to refer such cases and civil proceedings to bankruptcy courts, and district courts generally do so. But bankruptcy courts, unlike district courts, are not courts under Article III of the Constitution, and are therefore constrained in what powers they may constitutionally exercise.

Section 544(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code enables a trustee to step into the shoes of a creditor and avoid a transfer “of an interest of the debtor in property” that an unsecured creditor could avoid under applicable state law. See 11 U.S.C. § 544(b)(1). Thus, for example, if outside of bankruptcy a creditor could avoid a transaction entered by a debtor as a fraudulent transfer, in bankruptcy, the trustee acquires the power to avoid such a transaction.

We have blogged a fewtimes about the Supreme Court’s decision in Siegel v. Fitzgerald and its implications.

We have previously blogged about Bartenwerfer v. Buckley, No. 21-908, a Supreme Court case concerning the scope of the fraud exception to the dischargeability of debts in bankruptcy. Section 523 of the Bankruptcy Code exempts from discharge “any debt . . . for money, property, services, or an extension, renewal, or refinancing of credit, to the extent obtained by . . .

The concept of “property of the estate” is important in bankruptcy because it determines what property can be used or distributed for the benefit of the debtor’s creditors. Defined by section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code, “property of the estate” broadly encompasses the debtor’s interests in property, with certain additions and exceptions provided for in the Code. See 11 U.S.C. § 541. Difficult questions can arise in a contractual relationship between a debtor and a counterparty about whether an entity actually owns a particular asset or merely has some contractual right.

We have previously blogged about Siegel v. Fitzgerald, the Supreme Court decision last June that invalidated the 2018 difference in fees between bankruptcy cases filed in Bankruptcy Administrator judicial districts and U.S. Trustee judicial districts.