In Harrington v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 144 S. Ct. 2071 (2024) (“Purdue”), the Supreme Court held that the Bankruptcy Code does not authorize nonconsensual releases of nondebtors as part of a chapter 11 plan. The Court narrowly read the Code’s language, providing that a plan may “include any other appropriate provision not inconsistent with the applicable provisions of this title,” 11 U.S.C.

近年来，我国公开市场债券违约处置体制不断健全，违约处置方式不断丰富，违约处置的市场化程度进一步提升，债务重组作为一种公开市场债务处理的方式逐渐出现在人们的视野中。与此同时，受经济下行大环境的影响，债券市场违约事件频发，截至2023年一季度，公开市场多笔债券出现未按时兑付本息、回售款或利息，构成实质违约。为了寻求公开市场违约债券处置效率的进一步提升，健全公开市场债券信息披露制度，探索最优方式化解债券违约的路径，针对公开市场债券的特点，对处理手段及相应注意事项进行研究十分必要。本文将结合我国目前公开市场违约债券的处置现状和应对方式，从庭外重组与庭内重组程序的差异性出发，论述庭外债务重组作为处置手段的特殊性及应当重点注意的事项等，明确以庭外债务重组手段处置公开市场债务将会进一步提升债券违约处置机制市场化、法治化水平。

一、我国公开市场违约债券处置现状

2021年，我国债券市场新增23家违约发行人，共涉及到期违约债券87期，到期违约金额合计约1015.76亿元；17家发行人首次发生展期，涉及展期债券33期，展期规模157.31亿元，较上年增多。[1]

We have previouslyblogged about the section 546(e) defense to a trustee’s avoidance powers under the Bankruptcy Code. A trustee has broad powers to set aside certain transfers made by debtors before bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 547, 548.

随着社会发展与商业模式的不断丰富，不同商事主体之间会因愈发复杂的交易往来产生繁多的债权债务关系，整体经济环境下行、转入逆周期的情况下，债务危机频频爆发，债务重组已成为债务危机化解的一种重要方式，而债务重组能否成功的关键因素取决于是否存在契合企业、债权人、投资人甚至政府或监管机关要求的重组方案，故债务重组方案的设计是债务重组的重中之重。本文结合相关项目经验，对债务重组方案设计的总体思路及流程，以及中介机构在重组方案设计时的角色作用提出探讨，以期更好地促进债务重组工作之推进。

一、重组范围

2018年以来，选择以庭外重组方式化解债务风险的大型民营企业逐渐变多，同时在实践中，为了固化庭外债务重组协议之效力，越来越多企业根据自身需要，寻求以庭外重组与庭内重组相结合的、综合性化解债务危机的路径。在这样的现实背景下，对庭外债务重组与庭内重组程序的衔接及组合运用进行研究便显得十分必要了。本文将结合我国相关政策规定和案例实践，探讨庭外债务重组与庭内重组程序衔接的合理性、可行性以及两者进行衔接的模式。

一、庭外重组与庭内重组程序的现实需求

庭外重组与庭内重组（包括破产重整和破产和解）均为化解债务风险的路径。庭内重组通过破产法规定及司法权力介入等形式，赋予了重整计划或和解协议“多数决”的强制约束力，以及解封解押等的强制执行力。但庭外重组实质是债务人与主要债权人私下自愿协商，或者在中立第三人主持下达成债务调整合意的过程，达成的合意不具有司法强制执行力。

We have previously blogged about the section 546(e) defense to a trustee’s avoidance powers under the Bankruptcy Code. A trustee has broad powers to set aside certain transfers made by debtors before bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 547, 548. Section 546(e), however, bars avoiding certain transfers, including a “settlement payment . . . made by or to (or for the benefit of) . . . a financial institution [or] a transfer made by or to (or for the benefit of) a . . . financial institution . . . in connection with a securities contract.” 11 U.S.C. § 546(e).

Federal law assigns to U.S. district courts original jurisdiction over all cases under Title 11 (the Bankruptcy Code) and all civil proceedings arising under Title 11 or arising in or relating to Title 11. See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a), (b). Federal law permits each U.S. district court to refer such cases and civil proceedings to bankruptcy courts, and district courts generally do so. But bankruptcy courts, unlike district courts, are not courts under Article III of the Constitution, and are therefore constrained in what powers they may constitutionally exercise.

Section 544(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code enables a trustee to step into the shoes of a creditor and avoid a transfer “of an interest of the debtor in property” that an unsecured creditor could avoid under applicable state law. See 11 U.S.C. § 544(b)(1). Thus, for example, if outside of bankruptcy a creditor could avoid a transaction entered by a debtor as a fraudulent transfer, in bankruptcy, the trustee acquires the power to avoid such a transaction.

We have blogged a fewtimes about the Supreme Court’s decision in Siegel v. Fitzgerald and its implications.

We have previously blogged about Bartenwerfer v. Buckley, No. 21-908, a Supreme Court case concerning the scope of the fraud exception to the dischargeability of debts in bankruptcy. Section 523 of the Bankruptcy Code exempts from discharge “any debt . . . for money, property, services, or an extension, renewal, or refinancing of credit, to the extent obtained by . . .