In Harrington v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 144 S. Ct. 2071 (2024) (“Purdue”), the Supreme Court held that the Bankruptcy Code does not authorize nonconsensual releases of nondebtors as part of a chapter 11 plan. The Court narrowly read the Code’s language, providing that a plan may “include any other appropriate provision not inconsistent with the applicable provisions of this title,” 11 U.S.C.

We have previouslyblogged about the section 546(e) defense to a trustee’s avoidance powers under the Bankruptcy Code. A trustee has broad powers to set aside certain transfers made by debtors before bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 547, 548.

We have previously blogged about the section 546(e) defense to a trustee’s avoidance powers under the Bankruptcy Code. A trustee has broad powers to set aside certain transfers made by debtors before bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 547, 548. Section 546(e), however, bars avoiding certain transfers, including a “settlement payment . . . made by or to (or for the benefit of) . . . a financial institution [or] a transfer made by or to (or for the benefit of) a . . . financial institution . . . in connection with a securities contract.” 11 U.S.C. § 546(e).

Federal law assigns to U.S. district courts original jurisdiction over all cases under Title 11 (the Bankruptcy Code) and all civil proceedings arising under Title 11 or arising in or relating to Title 11. See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a), (b). Federal law permits each U.S. district court to refer such cases and civil proceedings to bankruptcy courts, and district courts generally do so. But bankruptcy courts, unlike district courts, are not courts under Article III of the Constitution, and are therefore constrained in what powers they may constitutionally exercise.

Section 544(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code enables a trustee to step into the shoes of a creditor and avoid a transfer “of an interest of the debtor in property” that an unsecured creditor could avoid under applicable state law. See 11 U.S.C. § 544(b)(1). Thus, for example, if outside of bankruptcy a creditor could avoid a transaction entered by a debtor as a fraudulent transfer, in bankruptcy, the trustee acquires the power to avoid such a transaction.

We have blogged a fewtimes about the Supreme Court’s decision in Siegel v. Fitzgerald and its implications.

我国现行的《环境保护法》、《民法典》侵权责任编、《企业破产法》以及最高人民法院相关司法解释对于追究企业的环境侵权民事责任作出了相应的规定，但对于企业破产阶段的环境侵权之债的清偿顺序问题，并未作出明确规定，如果仅将其作为普通债权进行处理，往往导致企业的环境债务无法得到清偿。在此前提下，破产程序中的环境债务问题已引起司法部门高度重视。2022年11月4日，贵阳市中级人民法院出台的《贵阳市中级人民法院关于审理企业破产案件中涉生态环境问题处理的工作指引》，体现出法院不断强化环境保护司法力度的趋势；2023年2月，最高人民法院发布的推进碳达峰碳中和典型案例四“杭州某球拍公司破产清算案”[1]，将案涉危废物处置费用作为破产费用列支，充分反映出司法对生态环境保护愈加强化。

破产企业环境债务与职工债务、税务债务一样，均具有社会性、公益性的特殊性质，同时环境债务所承载的环境治理长远性意义尤甚。因此，破产企业环境债务的清偿问题亟待厘清。

一、企业破产程序中的环境债务

（一）环境债务的形成

We have previously blogged about Bartenwerfer v. Buckley, No. 21-908, a Supreme Court case concerning the scope of the fraud exception to the dischargeability of debts in bankruptcy. Section 523 of the Bankruptcy Code exempts from discharge “any debt . . . for money, property, services, or an extension, renewal, or refinancing of credit, to the extent obtained by . . .

The concept of “property of the estate” is important in bankruptcy because it determines what property can be used or distributed for the benefit of the debtor’s creditors. Defined by section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code, “property of the estate” broadly encompasses the debtor’s interests in property, with certain additions and exceptions provided for in the Code. See 11 U.S.C. § 541. Difficult questions can arise in a contractual relationship between a debtor and a counterparty about whether an entity actually owns a particular asset or merely has some contractual right.

We have previously blogged about Siegel v. Fitzgerald, the Supreme Court decision last June that invalidated the 2018 difference in fees between bankruptcy cases filed in Bankruptcy Administrator judicial districts and U.S. Trustee judicial districts.