In Harrington v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 144 S. Ct. 2071 (2024) (“Purdue”), the Supreme Court held that the Bankruptcy Code does not authorize nonconsensual releases of nondebtors as part of a chapter 11 plan. The Court narrowly read the Code’s language, providing that a plan may “include any other appropriate provision not inconsistent with the applicable provisions of this title,” 11 U.S.C.

The Privy Council endorsed the Commercial Court's approach in the British Virgin Islands (BVI) in staying insolvency proceedings, even when faced with a pre-existing arbitration agreement, only when a debt is genuinely disputed on substantial grounds.

Introduction

We have previouslyblogged about the section 546(e) defense to a trustee’s avoidance powers under the Bankruptcy Code. A trustee has broad powers to set aside certain transfers made by debtors before bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 547, 548.

We have previously blogged about the section 546(e) defense to a trustee’s avoidance powers under the Bankruptcy Code. A trustee has broad powers to set aside certain transfers made by debtors before bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 547, 548. Section 546(e), however, bars avoiding certain transfers, including a “settlement payment . . . made by or to (or for the benefit of) . . . a financial institution [or] a transfer made by or to (or for the benefit of) a . . . financial institution . . . in connection with a securities contract.” 11 U.S.C. § 546(e).

Federal law assigns to U.S. district courts original jurisdiction over all cases under Title 11 (the Bankruptcy Code) and all civil proceedings arising under Title 11 or arising in or relating to Title 11. See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a), (b). Federal law permits each U.S. district court to refer such cases and civil proceedings to bankruptcy courts, and district courts generally do so. But bankruptcy courts, unlike district courts, are not courts under Article III of the Constitution, and are therefore constrained in what powers they may constitutionally exercise.

The recent ex-tempore judgment of Kawaley J in Atom Holdings¹ in the Grand Court of the Cayman Islands serves as a timely reminder to practitioners and industry participants alike that obtaining an adjournment of a winding-up petition² requires cogent evidence demonstrating good reason(s) for delaying what is otherwise the collective right of creditors to seek relief via court intervention.

The Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court of Appeal has dismissed an application to stay the appointment of liquidators pending the outcome of an appeal against a landmark first instance decision by the BVI Commercial Court, in which it was determined that ultimate beneficial interest holders of notes are 'creditors' under the BVI Insolvency Act and so have standing to issue liquidation applications against defaulting note issuers.

Background

Section 544(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code enables a trustee to step into the shoes of a creditor and avoid a transfer “of an interest of the debtor in property” that an unsecured creditor could avoid under applicable state law. See 11 U.S.C. § 544(b)(1). Thus, for example, if outside of bankruptcy a creditor could avoid a transaction entered by a debtor as a fraudulent transfer, in bankruptcy, the trustee acquires the power to avoid such a transaction.

In a landmark decision, the BVI Commercial Court has confirmed that ultimate beneficial interest holders of notes are 'creditors' under the BVI Insolvency Act and so have standing to issue liquidation applications against defaulting note issuers.

Mourant Ozannes, working alongside Ashurst (Hong Kong) and Counsel, Peter Burgess of South Square, has secured a landmark decision in the matter of Cithara Global Multi-Strategy SPC (Cithara) v Haimen Zhongnan Investment Development (International) Co Ltd (the Company).

We have blogged a fewtimes about the Supreme Court’s decision in Siegel v. Fitzgerald and its implications.