Introducción

Este mes las resoluciones reseñadas son menos y de menor relevancia que el mes pasado. Destacamos en todo caso el auto de homologación de uno de los primeros planes de restructuración aprobados tras la entrada en vigor de la nueva ley 16/2022 con una peculiar formación de clases donde muchas de ellas son clases unipersonales.

También destacamos un auto del Juzgado de lo Mercantil número 3 de Gijón que niega el embargo preventivo de los bienes de los administradores de la concursada por no apreciarse que vaya a existir un déficit concursal.

Introducción

Esta edición tiene esta vez bastante contenido interesante entre el que destacamos:

The concept of “property of the estate” is important in bankruptcy because it determines what property can be used or distributed for the benefit of the debtor’s creditors. Defined by section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code, “property of the estate” broadly encompasses the debtor’s interests in property, with certain additions and exceptions provided for in the Code. See 11 U.S.C. § 541. Difficult questions can arise in a contractual relationship between a debtor and a counterparty about whether an entity actually owns a particular asset or merely has some contractual right.

Introducción

En las Píldoras de este mes de noviembre destacamos dos sentencias de audiencias provinciales:

• la de la AP de Tarragona que anula la garantía hipotecaria de la filial en favor de la deuda de su matriz a pesar de que había sido la matriz quien le aportó los fondos para comprar los inmuebles que se hipotecan. La audiencia adapta la doctrina de la compensación equivalente y considera que se sacrifica más de lo que se gana y por tanto el sacrificio patrimonial es injustificado.

We have previously blogged about Siegel v. Fitzgerald, the Supreme Court decision last June that invalidated the 2018 difference in fees between bankruptcy cases filed in Bankruptcy Administrator judicial districts and U.S. Trustee judicial districts.

To encourage parties to transact with debtors in bankruptcy, the Bankruptcy Code in corporate bankruptcies provides highest priority to “administrative expenses,” which include “the actual, necessary costs and expenses of preserving the estate.” 11 U.S.C. § 503(b); id. § 507(a)(2).

We have previously written about Siegel v. Fitzgerald, No. 21-441, the Supreme Court case considering the question of whether the 2018 difference in fees between Bankruptcy Administrator judicial districts and U.S. Trustee judicial districts was consistent with the Constitution’s uniformity requirement for bankruptcy laws.

A discharge in bankruptcy usually discharges a debtor from the debtor’s liabilities. Section 523 of the Bankruptcy Code, however, sets forth certain exceptions to this policy, including for “any debt . . . for money, property, services, or an extension, renewal, or refinancing of credit, to the extent obtained by . . . false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud. . . .” 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A).

Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution gives Congress the power to “establish . . . uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States.” While Congress has general authority to establish a bankruptcy system, bankruptcy laws must be “uniform.” But not every aspect of the bankruptcy system is the same across every judicial district.

The Bankruptcy Code grants the power to avoid certain transactions to a bankruptcy trustee or debtor-in-possession. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 547–48. Is there a general requirement that these avoidance powers only be used when doing so would benefit creditors? In a recent decision, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Mexico addressed this question, concluding, in the face of a split of authority, that there was such a requirement.