In Harrington v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 144 S. Ct. 2071 (2024) (“Purdue”), the Supreme Court held that the Bankruptcy Code does not authorize nonconsensual releases of nondebtors as part of a chapter 11 plan. The Court narrowly read the Code’s language, providing that a plan may “include any other appropriate provision not inconsistent with the applicable provisions of this title,” 11 U.S.C.
Since the inception of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 in December 2016, India has witnessed not only a paradigm shift from the conventional ‘debtor in possession’ to a progressive ‘creditor in control’ but has also produced desirable results under the new statutory debt resolution regime.
The IBBI Working Group on Group Insolvency (under the chairmanship of UK Sinha) and the MCA Cross Border Insolvency Rules/Regulations Committee having submitted their reports (collectively “Reports”) had recommended the introduction of a framework governing the resolution of enterprise groups under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (“IBC”) in September 2019 and December 2021 respectively.
Since the inception of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (“Code“), the debt resolution regime in India has witnessed not only a paradigm shift from the conventional ‘debtor in possession’ to a progressive ‘creditor in control’ but has also undergone a significant transformation, marking a departure from its traditional labyrinthine processes to a more streamlined and effective framework.
The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC) has been at loggerheads with the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA) on various occasions in the corporate insolvency resolution process (CIRP) of a distressed entity. Courts and tribunals have passed varying judgments, either giving primacy to the IBC or allowing the Enforcement Directorate (ED), a functionary under the PMLA, to perform its duties irrespective of the ongoing CIRP of a company.
We have previouslyblogged about the section 546(e) defense to a trustee’s avoidance powers under the Bankruptcy Code. A trustee has broad powers to set aside certain transfers made by debtors before bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 547, 548.
We have previously blogged about the section 546(e) defense to a trustee’s avoidance powers under the Bankruptcy Code. A trustee has broad powers to set aside certain transfers made by debtors before bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 547, 548. Section 546(e), however, bars avoiding certain transfers, including a “settlement payment . . . made by or to (or for the benefit of) . . . a financial institution [or] a transfer made by or to (or for the benefit of) a . . . financial institution . . . in connection with a securities contract.” 11 U.S.C. § 546(e).
Federal law assigns to U.S. district courts original jurisdiction over all cases under Title 11 (the Bankruptcy Code) and all civil proceedings arising under Title 11 or arising in or relating to Title 11. See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a), (b). Federal law permits each U.S. district court to refer such cases and civil proceedings to bankruptcy courts, and district courts generally do so. But bankruptcy courts, unlike district courts, are not courts under Article III of the Constitution, and are therefore constrained in what powers they may constitutionally exercise.
Section 544(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code enables a trustee to step into the shoes of a creditor and avoid a transfer “of an interest of the debtor in property” that an unsecured creditor could avoid under applicable state law. See 11 U.S.C. § 544(b)(1). Thus, for example, if outside of bankruptcy a creditor could avoid a transaction entered by a debtor as a fraudulent transfer, in bankruptcy, the trustee acquires the power to avoid such a transaction.