In Harrington v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 144 S. Ct. 2071 (2024) (“Purdue”), the Supreme Court held that the Bankruptcy Code does not authorize nonconsensual releases of nondebtors as part of a chapter 11 plan. The Court narrowly read the Code’s language, providing that a plan may “include any other appropriate provision not inconsistent with the applicable provisions of this title,” 11 U.S.C.
Judgment was handed down last week on the substantial directors' duties and wrongful trading claims brought against former directors of various BHS companies[1].
We have previouslyblogged about the section 546(e) defense to a trustee’s avoidance powers under the Bankruptcy Code. A trustee has broad powers to set aside certain transfers made by debtors before bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 547, 548.
Fraudulent trading is both a civil and criminal offence. The recent judgment of the High Court in Bouchier v Booth provided a helpful reminder of the principles that a Court will apply when considering whether directors have acted in a manner that constitutes fraudulent trading and the high threshold for proving fraudulent conduct.
The Court of Appeal has ruled that the previous decision of the High Court to sanction a restructuring plan ("Plan") that had been proposed by the Adler Group ("Adler") should be set aside. The decision marks the first appeal in relation to a restructuring plan under Part 26A of the Companies Act 2006 ("Companies Act") and the decision offers clarity on the approach to restructuring plans, particularly when considering issues of "fairness".
We have previously blogged about the section 546(e) defense to a trustee’s avoidance powers under the Bankruptcy Code. A trustee has broad powers to set aside certain transfers made by debtors before bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 547, 548. Section 546(e), however, bars avoiding certain transfers, including a “settlement payment . . . made by or to (or for the benefit of) . . . a financial institution [or] a transfer made by or to (or for the benefit of) a . . . financial institution . . . in connection with a securities contract.” 11 U.S.C. § 546(e).
The Supreme Court has provided welcome clarity for insolvency practitioners in confirming that administrators of a company appointed pursuant to the Insolvency Act 1986 ("IA 1986") will not be criminally liable for a failure by the company to comply with redundancy notification requirements.
Federal law assigns to U.S. district courts original jurisdiction over all cases under Title 11 (the Bankruptcy Code) and all civil proceedings arising under Title 11 or arising in or relating to Title 11. See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a), (b). Federal law permits each U.S. district court to refer such cases and civil proceedings to bankruptcy courts, and district courts generally do so. But bankruptcy courts, unlike district courts, are not courts under Article III of the Constitution, and are therefore constrained in what powers they may constitutionally exercise.
Section 544(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code enables a trustee to step into the shoes of a creditor and avoid a transfer “of an interest of the debtor in property” that an unsecured creditor could avoid under applicable state law. See 11 U.S.C. § 544(b)(1). Thus, for example, if outside of bankruptcy a creditor could avoid a transaction entered by a debtor as a fraudulent transfer, in bankruptcy, the trustee acquires the power to avoid such a transaction.
We have blogged a fewtimes about the Supreme Court’s decision in Siegel v. Fitzgerald and its implications.