A previously unsettled aspect regarding the High Court’s (Court) jurisdiction to appoint an examiner to a company which is not formed or registered under the Companies Act 2014 (2014 Act), has been considered in the recent case of In the matter of MAC Interiors Ltd [2023] IEHC 395.

Earlier this year, a group of bondholders advised by William Fry and owed over US$175m by GTLK Europe DAC (GTLK Europe) and GTLK Europe Capital DAC (GTLK Capital) (collectively the Companies) petitioned for the winding up of the Companies on a number of grounds, including that they had failed to discharge scheduled interest payments and the accelerated debt constituted by the bonds following the interest payment defaults.

The High Court (Court) had to determine whether proceeds from two investments in the estate in the bankruptcy of Bernard McNamara (McNamara) were payable to NALM under its security package, or whether they should be retained in the estate in the bankruptcy of McNamara for the benefit of creditors generally (substantive question).

We have blogged a fewtimes about the Supreme Court’s decision in Siegel v. Fitzgerald and its implications.

The High Court (Court) has found that it was not appropriate to make a winding up order in respect of a company under section 760(2) of the Companies Act 2014 (Act), where no party was nominated or consented to act as liquidator.

A recent Court of Appeal decision held that receivers are statutorily obliged to discharge preferential costs from assets available after deducting costs and expenses of a receiverirst line

The issue

We have previously blogged about Bartenwerfer v. Buckley, No. 21-908, a Supreme Court case concerning the scope of the fraud exception to the dischargeability of debts in bankruptcy. Section 523 of the Bankruptcy Code exempts from discharge “any debt . . . for money, property, services, or an extension, renewal, or refinancing of credit, to the extent obtained by . . .

The concept of “property of the estate” is important in bankruptcy because it determines what property can be used or distributed for the benefit of the debtor’s creditors. Defined by section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code, “property of the estate” broadly encompasses the debtor’s interests in property, with certain additions and exceptions provided for in the Code. See 11 U.S.C. § 541. Difficult questions can arise in a contractual relationship between a debtor and a counterparty about whether an entity actually owns a particular asset or merely has some contractual right.

We have previously blogged about Siegel v. Fitzgerald, the Supreme Court decision last June that invalidated the 2018 difference in fees between bankruptcy cases filed in Bankruptcy Administrator judicial districts and U.S. Trustee judicial districts.

In a recent decision, the Court of Appeal upheld a High Court finding, which granted a declaration under section 819 of the Companies Act 2014 (CA 2014), restricting the appellant director (Appellant) from acting as a director or secretary of a company for a period of five years, unless the company meets the requirements set out in subsection (3) of section 819.