Two recent Supreme Court of Canada decisions demonstrate that the corporate attribution doctrine is not a one-size-fits-all approach.

In Harrington v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 144 S. Ct. 2071 (2024) (“Purdue”), the Supreme Court held that the Bankruptcy Code does not authorize nonconsensual releases of nondebtors as part of a chapter 11 plan. The Court narrowly read the Code’s language, providing that a plan may “include any other appropriate provision not inconsistent with the applicable provisions of this title,” 11 U.S.C.

We have previouslyblogged about the section 546(e) defense to a trustee’s avoidance powers under the Bankruptcy Code. A trustee has broad powers to set aside certain transfers made by debtors before bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 547, 548.

一、问题的提出

债务人向债权人借款，由保证人提供保证担保。借款到期后，债务人与保证人均未偿还该笔借款。后法院裁定受理保证人的破产申请，债权人因此向保证人的管理人申报债权，要求保证人就债务人所欠借款及利息承担保证责任。管理人审查并确认了该笔债权。（简见以下表1案型法律关系表）根据《最高人民法院关于适用〈中华人民共和国民法典〉有关担保制度的解释》（下称“《民法典担保制度解释》”）第22条之规定，[1]保证债权应当自保证人的破产申请受理时起停止计息。与债务人破产时保证债权随同主债权停止计息不同的是，保证人破产导致保证债权停止计息，却不能反向及于主债权也停止计息。其后债务人向债权人清偿了部分债务。此时，管理人将面临如下难题：在主债权未停止计息的情况下，债权人获得债务人部分清偿后，在保证人的破产程序中，管理人先前认定的债权数额是否须要调整？如果须要调整，应该如何进行调整？鉴于该问题在实务中相对较为前沿，笔者曾多次尝试检索与之相关的法规、判例、理论文献、实务文章等，对于解决该问题的资料寥寥无几。虽无前人的解决方案可供参照，但该问题仍然亟待解决。在缺乏相应法律规范的情况下，下文将通过民法基础理论的推演，尝试为解决这一问题提供思路。

Court approval of a sale process in receivership or Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (“BIA”) proposal proceedings is generally a procedural order and objectors do not have an appeal as of right; they must seek leave and meet a high test in order obtain it. However, in Peakhill Capital Inc. v.

We have previously blogged about the section 546(e) defense to a trustee’s avoidance powers under the Bankruptcy Code. A trustee has broad powers to set aside certain transfers made by debtors before bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 547, 548. Section 546(e), however, bars avoiding certain transfers, including a “settlement payment . . . made by or to (or for the benefit of) . . . a financial institution [or] a transfer made by or to (or for the benefit of) a . . . financial institution . . . in connection with a securities contract.” 11 U.S.C. § 546(e).

Federal law assigns to U.S. district courts original jurisdiction over all cases under Title 11 (the Bankruptcy Code) and all civil proceedings arising under Title 11 or arising in or relating to Title 11. See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a), (b). Federal law permits each U.S. district court to refer such cases and civil proceedings to bankruptcy courts, and district courts generally do so. But bankruptcy courts, unlike district courts, are not courts under Article III of the Constitution, and are therefore constrained in what powers they may constitutionally exercise.

Section 544(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code enables a trustee to step into the shoes of a creditor and avoid a transfer “of an interest of the debtor in property” that an unsecured creditor could avoid under applicable state law. See 11 U.S.C. § 544(b)(1). Thus, for example, if outside of bankruptcy a creditor could avoid a transaction entered by a debtor as a fraudulent transfer, in bankruptcy, the trustee acquires the power to avoid such a transaction.

We have blogged a fewtimes about the Supreme Court’s decision in Siegel v. Fitzgerald and its implications.

We have previously blogged about Bartenwerfer v. Buckley, No. 21-908, a Supreme Court case concerning the scope of the fraud exception to the dischargeability of debts in bankruptcy. Section 523 of the Bankruptcy Code exempts from discharge “any debt . . . for money, property, services, or an extension, renewal, or refinancing of credit, to the extent obtained by . . .