Two recent Supreme Court of Canada decisions demonstrate that the corporate attribution doctrine is not a one-size-fits-all approach.

In Harrington v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 144 S. Ct. 2071 (2024) (“Purdue”), the Supreme Court held that the Bankruptcy Code does not authorize nonconsensual releases of nondebtors as part of a chapter 11 plan. The Court narrowly read the Code’s language, providing that a plan may “include any other appropriate provision not inconsistent with the applicable provisions of this title,” 11 U.S.C.

Le 27 juin 2024, la Cour suprême des États-Unis a publié une décision très attendue qu’elle a rendue dans l’affaire William K. Harrington, United States Trustee, Region 2, Petitioner v. Purdue Pharma L.P. et al. (l’« affaire Purdue »).

On June 27, 2024, the Supreme Court of the United States released its highly anticipated decision in William K. Harrington, United States Trustee, Region 2, Petitioner v. Purdue Pharma L.P. et al. (Purdue). At issue was whether the U.S. bankruptcy court had jurisdiction to confirm a plan that provided for releases in favour of non-debtor parties, including parties providing a significant monetary contribution in support of the plan itself.

We have previouslyblogged about the section 546(e) defense to a trustee’s avoidance powers under the Bankruptcy Code. A trustee has broad powers to set aside certain transfers made by debtors before bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 547, 548.

Dans le contexte en constante évolution des lois canadiennes en matière d’insolvabilité, le regroupement de patrimoines se révèle comme un recours puissant. Bien qu’il soit rarement utilisé, il est susceptible d’entraîner des répercussions importantes pour les entités débitrices visées et leurs créanciers. C’est d’ailleurs ce que souligne une décision récente de la Cour d’appel du Manitoba, laquelle met en avant cet élément complexe, mais crucial, du droit de l’insolvabilité.

REGROUPEMENT DE PATRIMOINES

In the ever-changing landscape of Canadian insolvency law, substantive consolidation emerges as a powerful yet rare remedy with substantial implications for debtor entities and their creditors, as highlighted by a recent decision from the Manitoba Court of Appeal, which sheds light on a complex yet crucial aspect of insolvency law.

SUBSTANTIVE CONSOLIDATION

Court approval of a sale process in receivership or Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (“BIA”) proposal proceedings is generally a procedural order and objectors do not have an appeal as of right; they must seek leave and meet a high test in order obtain it. However, in Peakhill Capital Inc. v.

We have previously blogged about the section 546(e) defense to a trustee’s avoidance powers under the Bankruptcy Code. A trustee has broad powers to set aside certain transfers made by debtors before bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 547, 548. Section 546(e), however, bars avoiding certain transfers, including a “settlement payment . . . made by or to (or for the benefit of) . . . a financial institution [or] a transfer made by or to (or for the benefit of) a . . . financial institution . . . in connection with a securities contract.” 11 U.S.C. § 546(e).

Federal law assigns to U.S. district courts original jurisdiction over all cases under Title 11 (the Bankruptcy Code) and all civil proceedings arising under Title 11 or arising in or relating to Title 11. See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a), (b). Federal law permits each U.S. district court to refer such cases and civil proceedings to bankruptcy courts, and district courts generally do so. But bankruptcy courts, unlike district courts, are not courts under Article III of the Constitution, and are therefore constrained in what powers they may constitutionally exercise.