Two recent Supreme Court of Canada decisions demonstrate that the corporate attribution doctrine is not a one-size-fits-all approach.
In Harrington v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 144 S. Ct. 2071 (2024) (“Purdue”), the Supreme Court held that the Bankruptcy Code does not authorize nonconsensual releases of nondebtors as part of a chapter 11 plan. The Court narrowly read the Code’s language, providing that a plan may “include any other appropriate provision not inconsistent with the applicable provisions of this title,” 11 U.S.C.
具有高风险高收益特征的私募基金自诞生以来吸引了无数投资者，它帮助很多投资者在短期内取得了可观的收益，但高收益必然伴随着高风险。在私募基金未取得理想的收益或甚至发生亏损后，部分投资者以基金管理人在募集、投资、投后管理、清算等过程中未适当履职为由，通过向监管部门投诉、提起诉讼或仲裁等方式要求基金管理人承担赔偿责任的案例比比皆是，对基金管理人的财务状况及后续展业造成了严重的不利影响。
本文结合清算过程中基金管理人可能出现的未适当履职及由此需承担的赔偿责任进行分析，以期引起基金管理人对基金清算工作的高度重视，避免自身及从业人员的赔偿责任。
一、延迟、怠于履行清算义务的赔偿责任
1. 未适当履职的情形
前言
私募基金“募投管退”等各阶段时常经历来自市场、政策及监管等种种不确定风险，这期间不仅基金管理人付出了大量的人力、物力以保障基金的正常运行和基金财产的安全，投资者也在默默期待取得理想的投资收益，而清算退出正是私募基金管理人与投资者迎来最终投资结果的阶段，清算完毕也意味着私募基金生命的终结，其重要性对于各方来说不言而喻。
一、私募基金清算的意义
私募基金的清算完毕代表着基金管理人、托管人及投资者等多方主体间法律关系的正式终结，对基金管理人、托管人而言，基金清算后将大幅减少其在投后管理中所投入的精力，且所应对的监管也会相应减少；对投资者而言，在基金清算后可以取回现有投资财产，保障自身资金的流动性；针对基金行业来说通过清算淘汰了部分“劣质”私募基金，彰显了优胜劣汰法则，可以使行业整体的发展越来越健康。
We have previouslyblogged about the section 546(e) defense to a trustee’s avoidance powers under the Bankruptcy Code. A trustee has broad powers to set aside certain transfers made by debtors before bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 547, 548.
Court approval of a sale process in receivership or Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (“BIA”) proposal proceedings is generally a procedural order and objectors do not have an appeal as of right; they must seek leave and meet a high test in order obtain it. However, in Peakhill Capital Inc. v.
We have previously blogged about the section 546(e) defense to a trustee’s avoidance powers under the Bankruptcy Code. A trustee has broad powers to set aside certain transfers made by debtors before bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 547, 548. Section 546(e), however, bars avoiding certain transfers, including a “settlement payment . . . made by or to (or for the benefit of) . . . a financial institution [or] a transfer made by or to (or for the benefit of) a . . . financial institution . . . in connection with a securities contract.” 11 U.S.C. § 546(e).
Federal law assigns to U.S. district courts original jurisdiction over all cases under Title 11 (the Bankruptcy Code) and all civil proceedings arising under Title 11 or arising in or relating to Title 11. See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a), (b). Federal law permits each U.S. district court to refer such cases and civil proceedings to bankruptcy courts, and district courts generally do so. But bankruptcy courts, unlike district courts, are not courts under Article III of the Constitution, and are therefore constrained in what powers they may constitutionally exercise.
Section 544(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code enables a trustee to step into the shoes of a creditor and avoid a transfer “of an interest of the debtor in property” that an unsecured creditor could avoid under applicable state law. See 11 U.S.C. § 544(b)(1). Thus, for example, if outside of bankruptcy a creditor could avoid a transaction entered by a debtor as a fraudulent transfer, in bankruptcy, the trustee acquires the power to avoid such a transaction.