Two recent Supreme Court of Canada decisions demonstrate that the corporate attribution doctrine is not a one-size-fits-all approach.

In Harrington v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 144 S. Ct. 2071 (2024) (“Purdue”), the Supreme Court held that the Bankruptcy Code does not authorize nonconsensual releases of nondebtors as part of a chapter 11 plan. The Court narrowly read the Code’s language, providing that a plan may “include any other appropriate provision not inconsistent with the applicable provisions of this title,” 11 U.S.C.

We have previouslyblogged about the section 546(e) defense to a trustee’s avoidance powers under the Bankruptcy Code. A trustee has broad powers to set aside certain transfers made by debtors before bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 547, 548.

Court approval of a sale process in receivership or Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (“BIA”) proposal proceedings is generally a procedural order and objectors do not have an appeal as of right; they must seek leave and meet a high test in order obtain it. However, in Peakhill Capital Inc. v.

We have previously blogged about the section 546(e) defense to a trustee’s avoidance powers under the Bankruptcy Code. A trustee has broad powers to set aside certain transfers made by debtors before bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 547, 548. Section 546(e), however, bars avoiding certain transfers, including a “settlement payment . . . made by or to (or for the benefit of) . . . a financial institution [or] a transfer made by or to (or for the benefit of) a . . . financial institution . . . in connection with a securities contract.” 11 U.S.C. § 546(e).

Federal law assigns to U.S. district courts original jurisdiction over all cases under Title 11 (the Bankruptcy Code) and all civil proceedings arising under Title 11 or arising in or relating to Title 11. See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a), (b). Federal law permits each U.S. district court to refer such cases and civil proceedings to bankruptcy courts, and district courts generally do so. But bankruptcy courts, unlike district courts, are not courts under Article III of the Constitution, and are therefore constrained in what powers they may constitutionally exercise.

Section 544(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code enables a trustee to step into the shoes of a creditor and avoid a transfer “of an interest of the debtor in property” that an unsecured creditor could avoid under applicable state law. See 11 U.S.C. § 544(b)(1). Thus, for example, if outside of bankruptcy a creditor could avoid a transaction entered by a debtor as a fraudulent transfer, in bankruptcy, the trustee acquires the power to avoid such a transaction.

We have blogged a fewtimes about the Supreme Court’s decision in Siegel v. Fitzgerald and its implications.

We have previously blogged about Bartenwerfer v. Buckley, No. 21-908, a Supreme Court case concerning the scope of the fraud exception to the dischargeability of debts in bankruptcy. Section 523 of the Bankruptcy Code exempts from discharge “any debt . . . for money, property, services, or an extension, renewal, or refinancing of credit, to the extent obtained by . . .

中伦观点

引言

在执行案件中，多个债权人争夺同一被执行人财产的情形并不罕见。在“僧多粥少”的情况下，债权人能否分配到财产以及能分配到多少财产往往取决于债权人是否采取了恰当的措施。由于执行相关法律法规较为繁杂，为了更好地阐述法律观点，本文我们将通过一个真实案件改编的模拟案例对执行程序中财产分配涉及实务问题逐一展开分析。

模拟案例引入

2018年，甲公司向乙公司出借2亿元用于经营，双方签订《抵押合同》约定乙公司将其名下A和B两处不动产抵押给甲公司，抵押范围包括乙公司欠甲公司的借款本金、利息及实现债权的费用。双方办理了抵押登记。因种种原因，两处不动产的登记簿登记显示抵押的债权数额分别为1000万元。后因乙公司无法到期偿还借款，甲公司向Y市法院起诉要求乙公司返回借款本金、利息及实现债权的费用并同时申请查分了乙公司名下C、D和E三处不动产。Y市法院判决乙公司偿还上述所有款项。