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Of particular interest to commercial landlords, the recent decision of the court in SBP 2 SARL v 2 Southbank Tenant Ltd [2025]EWHC 16 (Ch) illustrates the risks to a landlord of simply cross-referring to Section 123 of the Insolvency Act 1986 (respectively, Section 123 and the 1986 Act) in the forfeiture provisions of a lease without specifying any amendments to the statutory language and thereby provides a reminder of the importance of careful and accurate drafting.

Two recent Supreme Court of Canada decisions demonstrate that the corporate attribution doctrine is not a one-size-fits-all approach.

In Harrington v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 144 S. Ct. 2071 (2024) (“Purdue”), the Supreme Court held that the Bankruptcy Code does not authorize nonconsensual releases of nondebtors as part of a chapter 11 plan. The Court narrowly read the Code’s language, providing that a plan may “include any other appropriate provision not inconsistent with the applicable provisions of this title,” 11 U.S.C.

On Tuesday 23 April 2024, Macfarlanes hosted a roundtable discussion on the EU Directive on Restructuring and Insolvency of 20 June 2019 (EUR 2019/1023, Directive) and the method of, and tools offered by, its implementation across a number of EU member states and equivalent domestic legislation – namely Part 26A of the Companies Act 2006 (Part 26A) and restructuring plans (for more on restructuring plans under Part 26A of the Companies Act 2006, see our more in-depth article on “

We have previouslyblogged about the section 546(e) defense to a trustee’s avoidance powers under the Bankruptcy Code. A trustee has broad powers to set aside certain transfers made by debtors before bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 547, 548.

Court approval of a sale process in receivership or Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (“BIA”) proposal proceedings is generally a procedural order and objectors do not have an appeal as of right; they must seek leave and meet a high test in order obtain it. However, in Peakhill Capital Inc. v.

We have previously blogged about the section 546(e) defense to a trustee’s avoidance powers under the Bankruptcy Code. A trustee has broad powers to set aside certain transfers made by debtors before bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 547, 548. Section 546(e), however, bars avoiding certain transfers, including a “settlement payment . . . made by or to (or for the benefit of) . . . a financial institution [or] a transfer made by or to (or for the benefit of) a . . . financial institution . . . in connection with a securities contract.” 11 U.S.C. § 546(e).

Federal law assigns to U.S. district courts original jurisdiction over all cases under Title 11 (the Bankruptcy Code) and all civil proceedings arising under Title 11 or arising in or relating to Title 11. See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a), (b). Federal law permits each U.S. district court to refer such cases and civil proceedings to bankruptcy courts, and district courts generally do so. But bankruptcy courts, unlike district courts, are not courts under Article III of the Constitution, and are therefore constrained in what powers they may constitutionally exercise.

The court orders a disqualified director of an insolvent company to pay personal compensation to creditors.

This is only the second time the courts have considered a personal compensation order against a disqualified director since their introduction in 2015.

What happened?

Secretary of State v Barnsby [2023] EWHC 2284 (Ch) concerned an individual who was the sole director and majority shareholder of a company that sold package holidays.

Section 544(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code enables a trustee to step into the shoes of a creditor and avoid a transfer “of an interest of the debtor in property” that an unsecured creditor could avoid under applicable state law. See 11 U.S.C. § 544(b)(1). Thus, for example, if outside of bankruptcy a creditor could avoid a transaction entered by a debtor as a fraudulent transfer, in bankruptcy, the trustee acquires the power to avoid such a transaction.