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In late September 2020, the federal government announced that it would be introducing changes to Australia's Corporations Act (Act) and the most significant amendments to the corporate insolvency regimes in decades. The main objective is to help the small business sector deal with and overcome the economic, financial and trading challenges posed by the ongoing pandemic. Since then, the government has released its new laws via the Corporations Amendment (Corporation Insolvency Reforms) Bill 2020 (Cth) (New Laws).

The Australian federal government has continued introducing temporary and potentially permanent insolvency law reforms intended to assist the economic repair efforts during, and following, the pandemic. In the latest development, which occurred in somewhat strange circumstances, the federal government has announced that it will shortly introduce new laws into parliament, which are intended to reduce complexity, time and the costs for small businesses to restructure their financial affairs.

Last February, we blogged about the Third Circuit’s decision in In re Energy Future Holdings Corp, No. 19-1430, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 4947 (Feb. 18, 2020). The Third Circuit approved a process for resolving asbestos claims in which a bar date was imposed on filing the claims, but late claimants who were unaware of their asbestos claims would be allowed to have the bar date excused through Bankruptcy Rule 3003(c)(3). (A bar date is a date set by the court by which all claims against the debtor must be filed.

This post concerns computation of time under Bankruptcy Rule 9006. The specific issue addressed is whether a bankruptcy court — when computing a filing deadline — should count a day when its clerk’s office is closed, even if the electronic filing system is available. In a recent case, a federal district judge explained why in his view the day shouldn’t be counted. Labbadia v. Martin (In re Martin), No. 3:20-cv-939, 2020 WL 5300932, (SRU) (D. Conn. Sept. 4, 2020).

The Australian federal government has announced that the temporary changes it enacted in March to the Corporations Act (Cth) (Act) concerning insolvent trading laws and the creditor’s statutory demand regime (Insolvency laws) have been extended to 31 December 2020. The changes were due to expire on 25 September. 

Economic Fallout Continues

In an appeal of a bankruptcy court’s decision, a district court judge recently addressed the treatment of the “straddle year” for federal income tax under the Bankruptcy Code, which “does not appear to have been decided by any appellate court.” In re Affirmative Ins. Holdings Inc. United States v. Beskrone, No. 15-12136-CSS, 2020 WL 4287375, at *1 (D. Del. July 27, 2020).

Since late March 2020 there has been a steady stream of voluntary administrators seeking the assistance of the court to limit their personal liabilities under the Corporations Act (Cth) 2001 (Act) by pointing to the social and economic disruptions and restrictions caused by COVID-19.

Section 550 of the Bankruptcy Code provides that, when a transfer is avoided under one of several other sections of the Code, a trustee may recover “the property transferred, or, if the court so orders, the value of such property” from “the initial transferee of such transfer,” “the entity for whose benefit such transfer was made,” or “any immediate or mediate transferee of such initial transferee.” 11 U.S.C. § 550(a).

This post provides a quick primer on the administrative expense claims. These claims are entitled to priority for actual and necessary goods and services supplied to a debtor in bankruptcy. For a claim to qualify for administrative expense status, a debtor must request that the claimant provide goods and services post-petition or induce the claimant to do so. The goods or services must result in a benefit to the bankruptcy estate. And the claimant bears the burden of proof that a claim qualifies for priority treatment under 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(A).

Courts reviewing a bankruptcy court’s decision to approve a chapter 11 reorganization plan over the objections of an interested party must consider not only the merits, but also (if implementation of the plan was not stayed) potential injury to the reliance interests of other parties relying on the plan. These issues are confronted in Drivetrain, LLC v. Kozel (In re Abengoa Bioenergy Biomass of Kansas), 2020 WL 2121449 (10th Cir.