引言：近期某集团破产清算案中，关于债务人与境外基金债权人之间因“维好协议”引发的纠纷事项，上海金融法院作出裁定，对境外债权人在香港特别行政区取得的对该债务人的胜诉判决予以认可，鉴此该境外债权人的债权有望在破产程序中获得确认。而其他破产案件中，管理人对境外投资人基于“维好协议”的债权作出不予确认的决定。由此，关于“维好协议”项下的债权人应如何主张权利、在“维好提供方”破产的情况下可否享有破产债权人地位并参与破产程序等问题众说纷纭。为此，本文将从“维好协议”的性质入手，在境内“维好提供方”破产语境下，阐述“维好协议”项下债权人可以主张权利的路径，并分析各救济途径在司法实践中的可行性。

一、“维好协议”的性质分析

（一）何谓“维好协议”

The Bankruptcy Code enables a trustee to set aside certain transfers made by debtors before bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 547, 548. These avoidance powers are subject to certain limitations, including a safe harbor in section 546(e) exempting certain transfers. Among other things, section 546(e) bars avoidance of a “settlement payment . . . made by or to (or for the benefit of) . . . a financial institution [or] a transfer made by or to (or for the benefit of) a . . . financial institution . . .

There are several ways in which property owners can advantageously use the Bankruptcy Code to effectuate strategic dispositions of assets. But the bankruptcy process can be fraught with uncertainty that can upend the best laid plans. The matter of In re Wansdown Properties Corp. N.V., No. 19-13223 (SMB), 2020 WL 5887542 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 2020) provides an instructive and cautionary example.

合伙型基金退出时，合伙人之间可能因存在争议而无法自行组建清算组或虽然组成清算组却无法顺利完成清算。这便引发合伙型基金可否通过法院程序进行司法清算的问题。我们曾代理过一起非常罕见的合伙型基金司法清算的案件，开创上海市指定第三人担任基金清算组负责人的先例，案件在其他诸多方面都在上海地区乃至全国具有领先地位和创新意义。

所谓司法清算，亦即强制清算，是相对于企业自行清算而言，一般是指法院介入合伙型基金清算程序的制度，可以是法院组建清算组，也可能是法院监督清算程序，亦或当清算出现障碍时请求法院排除妨碍等。针对公司的强制清算，最高人民法院出台了《最高人民法院关于适用中华人民共和国公司法>若干问题的规定（二）》（以下简称“《公司法司法解释（二）》”）及《关于审理公司强制清算案件工作座谈会纪要》（以下简称“《公司强清纪要》”）。但有关合伙型基金的清算尚无较为全面和细致的立法体系，因此，合伙型基金通过司法方式进行强制清算的先例很少，且争议颇多。

Last February, we blogged about the Third Circuit’s decision in In re Energy Future Holdings Corp, No. 19-1430, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 4947 (Feb. 18, 2020). The Third Circuit approved a process for resolving asbestos claims in which a bar date was imposed on filing the claims, but late claimants who were unaware of their asbestos claims would be allowed to have the bar date excused through Bankruptcy Rule 3003(c)(3). (A bar date is a date set by the court by which all claims against the debtor must be filed.

This post concerns computation of time under Bankruptcy Rule 9006. The specific issue addressed is whether a bankruptcy court — when computing a filing deadline — should count a day when its clerk’s office is closed, even if the electronic filing system is available. In a recent case, a federal district judge explained why in his view the day shouldn’t be counted. Labbadia v. Martin (In re Martin), No. 3:20-cv-939, 2020 WL 5300932, (SRU) (D. Conn. Sept. 4, 2020).

In an appeal of a bankruptcy court’s decision, a district court judge recently addressed the treatment of the “straddle year” for federal income tax under the Bankruptcy Code, which “does not appear to have been decided by any appellate court.” In re Affirmative Ins. Holdings Inc. United States v. Beskrone, No. 15-12136-CSS, 2020 WL 4287375, at *1 (D. Del. July 27, 2020).

Section 550 of the Bankruptcy Code provides that, when a transfer is avoided under one of several other sections of the Code, a trustee may recover “the property transferred, or, if the court so orders, the value of such property” from “the initial transferee of such transfer,” “the entity for whose benefit such transfer was made,” or “any immediate or mediate transferee of such initial transferee.” 11 U.S.C. § 550(a).

This post provides a quick primer on the administrative expense claims. These claims are entitled to priority for actual and necessary goods and services supplied to a debtor in bankruptcy. For a claim to qualify for administrative expense status, a debtor must request that the claimant provide goods and services post-petition or induce the claimant to do so. The goods or services must result in a benefit to the bankruptcy estate. And the claimant bears the burden of proof that a claim qualifies for priority treatment under 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(A).

Courts reviewing a bankruptcy court’s decision to approve a chapter 11 reorganization plan over the objections of an interested party must consider not only the merits, but also (if implementation of the plan was not stayed) potential injury to the reliance interests of other parties relying on the plan. These issues are confronted in Drivetrain, LLC v. Kozel (In re Abengoa Bioenergy Biomass of Kansas), 2020 WL 2121449 (10th Cir.