The High Court’s recent decision in Ramsay Health Care Australia Pty Ltd v Compton [2017] HCA 28 has confirmed a bankruptcy court can exercise a discretion to go behind the judgment debt where sufficient reason is shown for questioning whether there is a debt due to the petitioning creditor.

In the recent decision of Lane (Trustee), in the matter of Lee (Bankrupt) v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [2017] FCA 953, Cooper Grace Ward acted for the trustee in bankruptcy, who sought directions from the Court regarding the administration of a trading trust where the bankrupt was the trustee.

Facts

A recent case in New York State Supreme Court, One Williams Street Capital Management LP v. U.S. Education Loan Trust IV, LLC (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. May 15, 2015), affords a useful opportunity to review the applicability and scope of §13-107 of the New York General Obligations Law, which provides that a transfer of a bond “vests in the transferee all claims or demands of the transferrer.” The court observed that §13-107 extends to all claims, whether in contract or in tort, including fraud.

Indentures and other agreements governing complex, multitiered structured debt products will typically contain a series of reserves, the adequacy of whose funding will take precedence over payments to noteholders. While the funding requirements of the reserve accounts will be set forth in the agreement, the formulation of these provisions will leave administrators considerable leeway in determining the cash maintenance levels appropriate for the various accounts. In a recent case, UMB National Association v. Airplanes Limited (S.D.N.Y.

Unlike an opinion, an order of the court is often not from the pen of the judge. Typically, a court order is submitted to the judge after negotiation among the parties. So, when a disagreement arises among the parties regarding the interpretation of the court’s order, how does the judge who signed the order go about resolving the matter? The issue came up not long ago in Outer Harbor Terminal LLC (Bkr. D. Del. May, 5, 2017), in which Judge Laurie Silverstein of the District of  Delaware bankruptcy court was confronted with a dispute over her own final DIP order.

Section 477(2B) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) provides that a liquidator must not enter into any sort of agreement that may last longer than three months without first obtaining approval of the Court, of the committee of inspection or by a resolution of the creditors.

Typically, a litigation funding agreement will be caught by this section because it will last more than three months.

The reference to ‘enter into an agreement’ could also catch a novation, and potentially a variation, to an agreement.

All Australian states have sale of goods legislation that, in certain circumstances, allows an unpaid seller to retain possession of goods in transit where the buyer becomes insolvent. The statutory right, called stoppage intransitu, is a useful remedy to obtain payment.

A registered security interest on the PPSR is not required to exercise the statutory right. Administrators and liquidators may be trumped by a notice under the stoppage in transitu provisions.

However, the sale of goods legislation is not identical in each state.

Competing claims to goods are common where there is an unpaid seller with alleged retention of title, the supplier’s customer has gone into external administration and the goods are in the possession of a transport or warehouse provider. Thrown into the mix may be an administrator or liquidator demanding possession of the goods to sell them.

The recent case of M Webster Holdings Pty Limited (administrators appointed) v Specific Freight Pty Limited [2017] FCA 269 illustrates how a transport provider can become ‘the meat in the sandwich’ when a consignee of goods becomes insolvent.

Webster, a fashion retailer, operated two well-known Australian businesses, David Lawrence and Marcs. Webster was placed into administration in February 2017 and its administrators continued to trade with a view to securing a purchaser.

In a recent ruling, Trusa v. Nepo(Del. Ch. April 13, 2017), consistent with prior case law, Vice Chancellor Montgomery-Reeves of the Delaware Chancery Court held that a creditor cannot bring a derivative action against a Delaware limited liability company, even where the company is clearly insolvent. The ruling is interesting, because in the well-known case of North American Catholic Educational Programming Foundation, Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92 (Del.