Just because a liquidator asserts you have received an unfair preference, does not necessarily mean you have or that there are no potential defences available to you.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit recently overturned its own prior guidance to hold that an official creditors’ committee had an unconditional statutory right to intervene in an adversary proceeding. The First Circuit joined the Second and Third Circuits to recognize that the right to intervene provided by the Bankruptcy Code is not limited to the main bankruptcy case, contrary to the long-standing rule in the Fifth Circuit. However, the First Circuit also held that the scope of intervention may be qualified, with limits set by the trial court on a case-by-case basis.

It is common for commercial contracts to contain ipso facto clauses, which allow a party to terminate or modify the terms of the contract where the other party experiences an insolvency event. A concern addressed by the Government is that these clauses can prevent a financially distressed company from turning their situation around.

The High Court’s recent decision in Ramsay Health Care Australia Pty Ltd v Compton [2017] HCA 28 has confirmed a bankruptcy court can exercise a discretion to go behind the judgment debt where sufficient reason is shown for questioning whether there is a debt due to the petitioning creditor.

In the recent decision of Lane (Trustee), in the matter of Lee (Bankrupt) v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [2017] FCA 953, Cooper Grace Ward acted for the trustee in bankruptcy, who sought directions from the Court regarding the administration of a trading trust where the bankrupt was the trustee.

Facts

Unlike an opinion, an order of the court is often not from the pen of the judge. Typically, a court order is submitted to the judge after negotiation among the parties. So, when a disagreement arises among the parties regarding the interpretation of the court’s order, how does the judge who signed the order go about resolving the matter? The issue came up not long ago in Outer Harbor Terminal LLC (Bkr. D. Del. May, 5, 2017), in which Judge Laurie Silverstein of the District of  Delaware bankruptcy court was confronted with a dispute over her own final DIP order.

Section 477(2B) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) provides that a liquidator must not enter into any sort of agreement that may last longer than three months without first obtaining approval of the Court, of the committee of inspection or by a resolution of the creditors.

Typically, a litigation funding agreement will be caught by this section because it will last more than three months.

The reference to ‘enter into an agreement’ could also catch a novation, and potentially a variation, to an agreement.

In the May 2017 issue of Debt Dialogue, we discussed the recent decision by Judge Martin Glenn of the U.S.

All Australian states have sale of goods legislation that, in certain circumstances, allows an unpaid seller to retain possession of goods in transit where the buyer becomes insolvent. The statutory right, called stoppage intransitu, is a useful remedy to obtain payment.

A registered security interest on the PPSR is not required to exercise the statutory right. Administrators and liquidators may be trumped by a notice under the stoppage in transitu provisions.

However, the sale of goods legislation is not identical in each state.

Competing claims to goods are common where there is an unpaid seller with alleged retention of title, the supplier’s customer has gone into external administration and the goods are in the possession of a transport or warehouse provider. Thrown into the mix may be an administrator or liquidator demanding possession of the goods to sell them.