Although the contentious background to the applications to restrain the presentation of two winding up petitions heard together in (but only listed singularly as) the case of Shorts Gardens LLB v London Borough of Camden Council [2020] EWHC 1001 (Ch) is somewhat unusual, these cases nonetheless raise some interesting points of principle which may be used by the courts in determining whether it is appropriate to restrain or dismiss a winding up petition due to COVID-19.

As businesses and companies in the UK face an uncertain few weeks and months with unprecedented pressures, it can be easy for directors to panic and not know where to turn.

To assist in decision-making, we give a reminder of the law in this area, and some signposts for those seeking help.

In this briefing, we give a short reminder of statutory duties owed by UK directors under the Companies Act 2006, the potential risks of continuing to trade while possibly insolvent, and actions that should be taken in order to mitigate those risks.

Directors’ duties

Hot on the heels of our April 2020 article on the proposed reintroduction of the Crown preference, Parliament has recently approved legislation that will increase the ring-fenced amount available to unsecured creditors on an insolvency of a company from £600,000 to £800,000.

In our last article, which can be found here, we reported on the government’s intention to give HMRC priority in the recovery of certain debts (including VAT, PAYE, Employee NICs, and Construction Industry Scheme deductions ) in insolvency proceedings.

In the landmark decision in Re Systems Building Services Group Limited [2020] EWHC 54 (Ch), ICC Judge Barber held that the duties of a director survive the insolvency of a company.

On Jan. 19, 2019, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit vacated a bankruptcy court decision awarding Ultra Petroleum Corp. noteholders $201 million in make-whole payments and $186 million in post-petition interest. Under the note agreement, upon a bankruptcy filing, the issuer is obligated for a make-whole amount equal to the discounted value of the remaining scheduled payments (including principal and interest that would be due after prepayment) less the principal amount of the notes.

In the first article of this two-part series on sell-side opportunistic engineering in the CDS market, we surveyed a number of strategies that could be used by sellers of CDS protection to create sell-side gains. In this second part, we analyze two recent situations where a proposed refinancing dramatically affected the CDS market for the reference entity because of the reduction in the sell-side risk. Although these cases may or may not have been driven by CDS considerations, they illustrate how sell-side CDS strategies may be effectively implemented.

Over the past few years, the CDS market has seen an increase in activism and the evolution of creative refinancing and restructuring strategies intended to achieve particular outcomes in the CDS market.

Part 1 of this series described the recent decision of the ISDA Americas Determinations Committee to declare that a “failure to pay” had occurred with respect to iHeartCommunications Inc., notwithstanding that the only non-payment had been to a wholly owned subsidiary. The non-payment was orchestrated to avoid a springing lien that would have been triggered had all the notes of a particular issue of iHeartCommunications debt been paid in full. It did not reflect on the creditworthiness of iHeartCommunications.