Introduction
On 20 May 2025, Mr Justice Marcus Smith handed down his eagerly-awaited judgment sanctioning the two inter-conditional restructuring plans (the Plans) proposed by members of the Petrofac Group. The judgment raises issues described as “going to the heart of the Part 26A regime” and is significant as the first case to consider the application of the Court of Appeal’s ruling in Thames Water.
The judgment addresses three particularly interesting points:
In Harrington v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 144 S. Ct. 2071 (2024) (“Purdue”), the Supreme Court held that the Bankruptcy Code does not authorize nonconsensual releases of nondebtors as part of a chapter 11 plan. The Court narrowly read the Code’s language, providing that a plan may “include any other appropriate provision not inconsistent with the applicable provisions of this title,” 11 U.S.C.
Prompted by the EU Restructuring Directive and accelerated by the pandemic, jurisdictions all across Europe have completely transformed their restructuring regimes in recent years. This is part of a global trend towards more debtor-friendly, rescue-orientated restructuring regimes, inspired by US Chapter 11.
We have previouslyblogged about the section 546(e) defense to a trustee’s avoidance powers under the Bankruptcy Code. A trustee has broad powers to set aside certain transfers made by debtors before bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 547, 548.
The English Court of Appeal has today overturned the restructuring plan sanction order made by the High Court in April 2023.
The keenly awaited judgment raises some difficult issues for Adler in the context of its restructuring, but more broadly clarifies a number of points in relation to restructuring plans.
How the court uses its discretion to sanction a plan
We have previously blogged about the section 546(e) defense to a trustee’s avoidance powers under the Bankruptcy Code. A trustee has broad powers to set aside certain transfers made by debtors before bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 547, 548. Section 546(e), however, bars avoiding certain transfers, including a “settlement payment . . . made by or to (or for the benefit of) . . . a financial institution [or] a transfer made by or to (or for the benefit of) a . . . financial institution . . . in connection with a securities contract.” 11 U.S.C. § 546(e).
As the nights draw in and the new year approaches, we take stock of the state of play for European restructuring and look ahead at potential trends for 2024.
Completion of legal reforms
Federal law assigns to U.S. district courts original jurisdiction over all cases under Title 11 (the Bankruptcy Code) and all civil proceedings arising under Title 11 or arising in or relating to Title 11. See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a), (b). Federal law permits each U.S. district court to refer such cases and civil proceedings to bankruptcy courts, and district courts generally do so. But bankruptcy courts, unlike district courts, are not courts under Article III of the Constitution, and are therefore constrained in what powers they may constitutionally exercise.
Section 544(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code enables a trustee to step into the shoes of a creditor and avoid a transfer “of an interest of the debtor in property” that an unsecured creditor could avoid under applicable state law. See 11 U.S.C. § 544(b)(1). Thus, for example, if outside of bankruptcy a creditor could avoid a transaction entered by a debtor as a fraudulent transfer, in bankruptcy, the trustee acquires the power to avoid such a transaction.
We have blogged a fewtimes about the Supreme Court’s decision in Siegel v. Fitzgerald and its implications.