The FTX Group, an international cryptocurrency exchange platform, spectacularly collapsed in November 2022, resulting in FTX Trading Limited and 101 affiliated companies filing for relief under Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code in the United States Bankruptcy Court in Delaware. The Australian arm of the FTX group, FTX Australia Pty Ltd (‘FTX Aust’) and FTX Express Pty Ltd (‘FTX Express’) (collectively the ‘Companies’) was placed into administration in Australia shortly before the Chapter 11 filing.

Since 1993, decisions out of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York consistently adopted the aggregate “rent approach” for calculating lease rejection damages in bankruptcy proceedings. But in Bankruptcy Judge Wiles’ recent decision in In re Cortlandt Liquidating LLC, he departed from the “rent approach” in favor of the “time approach,” which is based on the time remaining under the lease rather than factoring in the total or aggregate rent still owed under the lease.

On August 11, 2020, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed lower court decisions rejecting Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc.’s (“LBSF”) attempt to recover nearly $1 billion in payments to noteholders and enforcing certain Priority Provisions (defined below) that subordinated payments otherwise payable to LBSF under related swap transactions.

On Tuesday 24 March 2020 the Commonwealth Parliament passed emergency laws responding to the COVID 19 Pandemic. [1]

Critically the Government has enacted amendments to the Corporations Act 2001 (Act):

On November 8, 2018, Judge Vyskocil of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York issued a decision dismissing the involuntary petition that had been filed against Taberna Preferred Funding IV, Ltd. (“Taberna”), a non-recourse CDO, thus ending a nearly seventeen-month-long saga that was followed closely by bankruptcy practitioners and securitization professionals alike. SeeTaberna Preferred Funding IV, Ltd. v. Opportunities II Ltd., et. al., (In re Taberna Preferred Funding IV, Ltd.), No. 17-11628 (MKV), 2018 WL 5880918, at *24 (Bankr.

On June 6, 2012, Bankruptcy Judge Martin Glenn of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York approved a $2.875 million key employee incentive plan (“KEIP”) in the Velo Holdings bankruptcy cases over the objection of the U.S. Trustee finding that it was primarily incentivizing and a sound exercise of the debtors’ business judgment.  Inre Velo Holdings Inc., Case No. 12-11384 (MG), 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 2535 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012).  The decision follows well-settled law in the Southern District and Delaware regarding approval of KEIPs.

On May 25, 2012, Judge Allan L. Gropper of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York approved a motion to compel the production of certain documents under section 1521 of the Bankruptcy Code.  In his decision, Judge Gropper also suggested that the broad discovery provisions of Bankruptcy Rule 2004 may apply to chapter 15 discovery requests, but stopped short of making such a ruling.  In re Millennium Global Emerging Credit Master Fund Limited, Case No. 11-13171 (ALG), (Bankr. S.D.N.Y May 25, 2012).

On May 4, 2012 Judge Kevin J. Carey of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware held that a claim against a debtor’s estate, transferred to a third party, is subject to the same infirmities as in the hands of the original holder of the claim.  In re KB Toys, Inc., — B.R. —-, 2012 WL 1570755, at *11 (Bankr. D. Del. 2012).  Judge Carey’s opinion diverged from, and criticized, the decision of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York in Enron Corp. v. Springfield Assocs., L.L.C., 379 B.R. 425 (S.D.N.Y.

In the W.R. Grace bankruptcy, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently reaffirmed its prior rulings on the controversial issue of a bankruptcy court’s power to enjoin actions by third parties against non-debtors.1 Resting on prior precedent, the Third Circuit held that bankruptcy courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to enjoin third party actions that have no direct effect upon the bankruptcy estate.