The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently articulated a standard to determine what claims may be barred against a purchaser of assets "free and clear" of claims pursuant to section 363(f) of the Bankruptcy Code and highlighted procedural due process concerns with respect to enforcement.1 The decision arose out of litigation regarding certain defects, including the well-known "ignition switch defect," affecting certain GM vehicles. GM's successor (which acquired GM's assets in a section 363 sale in 2009) asserted that a "free and clear" provisi
On March 29, 2016, the Second Circuit addressed the breadth and application of the Bankruptcy Code's safe harbor provisions in an opinion that applied to two cases before it. The court analyzed whether: (i) the Bankruptcy Code's safe harbor provisions preempt individual creditors' state law fraudulent conveyance claims; and (ii) the automatic stay bars creditors from asserting such claims while the trustee is actively pursuing similar claims under the Bankruptcy Code. In In re Tribune Co.
The District Court for the Central District of California recently held that an assignee that acquired rights to a terminated swap agreement was not a "swap participant" under the Bankruptcy Code and, therefore, could not invoke safe harbors based on that status to foreclose on collateral in the face of the automatic stay. [1] The court ruled that the assignee acquired only a right to collect payment under the swap agreement, not the assignor's rights under the Bankruptcy Code to exercise remedies without first seeking court approval.
Background
On May 21, 2015, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (the "Third Circuit") held that in rare instances a bankruptcy court may approve a "structured dismissal"- that is, a dismissal "that winds up the bankruptcy with certain conditions attached instead of simply dismissing the case and restoring the status quo ante" - that deviates from the Bankruptcy Code's priority scheme. See Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors v. CIT Group/Business Credit Inc. (In re Jevic Holding Corp.), Case No.
On October 31, 2014, Bankruptcy Judge Kaplan of the District of New Jersey addressed two issues critically important to intellectual property licensees and purchasers: (i) can a trademark licensee use section 365(n) of the Bankruptcy Code to keep licensed marks following a debtor-licensor’s rejection of a license agreement?; and (ii) can a “free and clear” sale of intellectual property eliminate any rights retained by a licensee? In re Crumbs Bake Shop, Inc., et al., 2014 WL 5508177 (Bankr. D.N.J. Oct. 31, 2014).
Earlier this year, we reported on a decision limiting a secured creditor's right to credit bid purchased debt (capping the credit bid at the discounted price paid for the debt) to facilitate an auction in Fisker Automotive Holdings' chapter 11 case.1 In the weeks that followed, the debtor held a competitive (nineteen-round) auction and ultimately selected Wanxiang America Corporation, rather than the secured creditor, as the w
On September 25, 2012, Judge D. Michael Lynn for the United States Bankruptcy Court of the Northern District of Texas held that a “tail provision” for professional fees rendered prepetition survived – and was not cut off by – the debtor’s bankruptcy filing. In re Texas Rangers Baseball Partners, Case No. 10-43400-DML, 2012 WL 4464550 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Sept. 25, 2012).
Background
On August 2, 2012, in the case ofIn re MBS Management Services, Inc.,1 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled that a retail electricity agreement with a real estate management company constituted a forward contract protected by the “safe harbor” provisions of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code (“Bankruptcy Code”).
On May 30, 2012, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that a bankruptcy court in one federal district lacks jurisdiction to determine whether a debt was discharged under a chapter 11 plan confirmation order issued by a bankruptcy court in another federal district. Alderwoods Group, Inc. v. Garcia, 1:10-cv-20509-KMM, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 10891 (11th Cir. May 30, 2012). The decision makes it clear that a debtor must seek enforcement of its discharge order in the same federal court that granted the discharge in the first place.
On May 4, 2012, Judge J. Paul Oetken of the United States District Court of the Southern District of New York held that the Bankruptcy Court has the injunctive power to enforce the automatic stay against entities falling within the Bankruptcy Court’s in personam jurisdiction, and that, in this case, the enforcement of the automatic stay did not violate interests of comity. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp v. Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec., LLC (In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec., LLC), No. 11 Civ. 8629 (JPO), 2012 WL 1570859 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2012).