The scope and extent of debts that may be discharged is an often litigated issue in bankruptcy. In a recent Chapter 13 case in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, the bankruptcy court considered whether an otherwise dischargeable government penalty debt is nondischargeable if the debt arises from fraud^.[1]

The Bankruptcy Code is federal law. It affords debtors protections - including the automatic stay and debt discharge injunction - that hold creditors at bay.

The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) is also federal law. It contains limitations on what a debt collector can do when attempting to collect a debt.

Because debts - and more particularly attempts to collect those debts - drive people into bankruptcy, bankruptcy courts are sometimes forced to grapple with questions of how the Bankruptcy Code and FDCPA interact and impact each other.

Sixth Circuit Affirms Bankruptcy Court Order Allowing Amended Exemptions Following Re-Opening of Case

In a Chapter 7 bankruptcy case, a debtor is required to file a schedule listing all of the debtor’s property. This includes cash, hard assets such as furniture and cars, as well as intangibles such as causes of action or potential causes of action. The Bankruptcy Code allows debtors to “exempt” certain types of property from the estate, enabling them to retain exempted assets post-bankruptcy.

On May 4, 2015, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Bullard v. Blue Hills Bank, No. 14-116, a case which deals with issues of finality and appealability of orders in bankruptcy proceedings. In a unanimous opinion written by Chief Justice Roberts, the Court held that a bankruptcy court’s order denying confirmation of a Chapter 13 debtor’s proposed repayment plan is not a final order and thus is not immediately appealable.

BACKGROUND

When an individual contemplates filing for bankruptcy protection, he or she has a few options. One is to file a Chapter 7 case, and another is to file a Chapter 13 case. In a Chapter 7, all of a debtor’s non-exempt assets are transferred to a bankruptcy estate to be liquidated and distributed to creditors. In a Chapter 13, the debtor retains assets and makes payments to creditors according to a court-approved plan.

Upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition, an automatic stay goes into effect which provides a debtor with immediate protection from collection efforts by creditors. But the automatic stay is not without limitations.

There has been much discussion in the media in the past year about the massive amount of professional fees that have been wracked up during the City of Detroit's Chapter 9 bankruptcy. There is always great interest - and debate - about such fees due to the nature of the process: insolvent individuals or companies with no place left to turn file for bankruptcy, creditors take a "haircut" on their claims, and the lawyers get paid. Or so the story goes. As with any complex process, though, there is plenty of nuance that gets lost in the wash, and often is more to the story.

On September 25, 2012, Judge D. Michael Lynn for the United States Bankruptcy Court of the Northern District of Texas held that a “tail provision” for professional fees rendered prepetition survived – and was not cut off by – the debtor’s bankruptcy filing.  In re Texas Rangers Baseball Partners, Case No. 10-43400-DML, 2012 WL 4464550 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Sept. 25, 2012).

Background

On May 30, 2012, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that a bankruptcy court in one federal district lacks jurisdiction to determine whether a debt was discharged under a chapter 11 plan confirmation order issued by a bankruptcy court in another federal district.  Alderwoods Group, Inc. v. Garcia, 1:10-cv-20509-KMM, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 10891 (11th Cir. May 30, 2012).  The decision makes it clear that a debtor must seek enforcement of its discharge order in the same federal court that granted the discharge in the first place.

On May 4, 2012, Judge J. Paul Oetken of the United States District Court of the Southern District of New York held that the Bankruptcy Court has the injunctive power to enforce the automatic stay against entities falling within the Bankruptcy Court’s in personam jurisdiction, and that, in this case, the enforcement of the automatic stay did not violate interests of comity.  Sec. Investor Prot. Corp v. Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec., LLC (In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec., LLC), No. 11 Civ. 8629 (JPO), 2012 WL 1570859 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2012).