On November 27, 2012, in a ruling that undoubtedly will impact the choice of venue for many large corporate bankruptcies in the future, Judge Shelley C. Chapman of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York transferred venue of the chapter 11 cases of Patriot Coal Corporation and ninety-eight of its affiliates to the Eastern District of Missouri.

On September 25, 2012, Judge D. Michael Lynn for the United States Bankruptcy Court of the Northern District of Texas held that a “tail provision” for professional fees rendered prepetition survived – and was not cut off by – the debtor’s bankruptcy filing.  In re Texas Rangers Baseball Partners, Case No. 10-43400-DML, 2012 WL 4464550 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Sept. 25, 2012).

Background

On August 2, 2012, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that a requirements contract for the supply of electricity constituted a “forward contract” under the Bankruptcy Code and, therefore, was exempt from preference avoidance actions.  The Fifth Circuit held that the contract in this case met the plain language definition of a “forward contract,” notwithstanding the fact that it lacked fixed quantity and delivery date terms.  Lightfoot v. MXEnergy Elec., Inc. (In re MBS Mgmt. Servs., Inc.), 2012 WL 3125167 (5th Cir. Aug. 2, 2012).

On August 31, 2012, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit published its first decision expressly adopting an abuse of discretion standard for reviewing equitable mootness determinations by district courts. In In re Charter Communications, Inc., the Second Circuit followed the Third and Tenth Circuits, while also reaffirming the Second Circuit’s rebuttable presumption of equitable mootness upon substantial consummation of a debtor’s plan.

On July 9, 2012, Judge Mary F. Walrath of the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware disallowed a claim for rejection damages related to a real estate development agreement, because the claim had been released upon the termination of an LLC Agreement, and the underlying ground lease never came into existence.  In re Magna Entm’t Corp., 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 3089 (Bankr. D. Del. July 9, 2012).  

Background

On June 22, 2012, Judge Robert E. Gerber of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York granted the U.S. Trustee’s motion to transfer the chapter 11 cases of Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing Company and its affiliates to a different venue, notwithstanding the fact that the debtor’s prepackaged plan had been confirmed with unanimous support from its creditors, the cases were projected to conclude within 30 days of filing, and the debtors’ primary creditor constituencies supported venue in New York.

In a decision further defining when US public policy restricts the relief a court may grant in aid of a foreign restructuring or insolvency proceeding, the Bankruptcy Court in the Chapter 15 case of Vitro, S.A.B. de C.V. v. ACP Master, Ltd. (In re Vitro, S.A.B. de C.V.), Ch. 15 Case No. 11-33335-HDH-15, 2012 WL 2138112 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Jun. 13, 2012) refused to a enforce a Mexican restructuring plan that novated and extinguished the guaranty obligations of the Mexican debtor’s non-debtor subsidiary guarantors.

Whether a secured creditor has an absolute right to credit bid at a sale under a chapter 11 plan has been the subject of conflicting decisions rendered by the Third, Fifth and Seventh Circuits.¹ The United States Supreme Court has resolved these inconsistent rulings with its decision in RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC, et al., v. Amalgamated Bank, ² which affirmed the Seventh Circuit’s holding that a secured creditor has an absolute right to credit bid in a sale under a chapter 11 plan.

Section 541(a) of the Bankruptcy Code creates a worldwide estate comprising all of the legal or equitable interests of the debtor, “wherever located,” held by the debtor as of the filing date.¹ The Bankruptcy Code’s automatic stay, in turn, applies “to all entities” and protects the debtor’s property and the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction by barring “any act to obtain possession of property of the estate . . .

On September 2, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed a holding by the Court of Chancery that creditors of insolvent Delaware limited liability companies do not have standing to sue derivatively. This contrasts with Delaware corporations: the Delaware courts have recognized that when a corporation becomes insolvent, creditors become the residual risk-bearers and are permitted to sue derivatively on behalf of a corporation to the same extent as stockholders.