In January, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indiansv. Coughlin after the First Circuit barred the Lac du Flambeau Band from seeking to collect on a $1,600 debt obligation to the tribe’s lending arm, Lendgreen, after the debtor filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy.

In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court held that § 523(a)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code precludes a debtor from discharging a debt obtained by fraud, regardless of the debtor’s own culpability. In Bartenwerfer v. Buckley, issued February 22, the Court concluded that “§ 523(a)(2)(A) turns on how the money was obtained, not who committed fraud to obtain it.”

It is well settled that the purpose of filing a bankruptcy petition is to “give[] the honest but unfortunate debtor . . . a new opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of pre-existing debt.” Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, (1934). A debtor’s discharge in bankruptcy, and the corresponding injunction provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, are the two primary elements that effectuate this financial fresh start.Chapman v. Bituminous Ins. Co. (In re Coho Res., Inc.), 345 F.3d 338, 342 (5th Cir. 2003).

The West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act (“WVCCPA”) is a remedial statute designed to protect West Virginia consumers from improper debt collection. Only “consumers” have standing to file a lawsuit under the WVCCPA. The term “consumer” is defined as a natural person that owes a debt or allegedly owes a debt. But does a person still owe debt if that debt was discharged by a bankruptcy court? Although there is some conflicting case law in West Virginia, an answer is forming.

Client Alert

On September 18, in an en banc review, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit overruled, in part, seminal casesBarger v. City of Cartersville, 348 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2003) and Burnes v. Pemco Aeroplex, Inc., 291 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2002), adopting a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis when facing questions of judicial estoppel.

In recent years, constructively fraudulent transfer claims asserted in bankruptcy cases, especially those arising from LBOs and similar shareholder transactions, have hit a major road block.

The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware recently issued an opinion that addresses, among other issues, the question of whether section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code preempts certain fraudulent transfer avoidance actions brought under state law. In re Physiotherapy Holdings Inc., No. 15-51238 (Bankr. D. Del. June 20, 2016).

Parties to all legal proceedings - including bankruptcy proceedings - are entitled to Constitutionally protected due process rights, including reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard. In the bankruptcy context, the debtor must give known creditors reasonable notice of certain critical events, including the sale of the debtor’s assets and the deadline to file claims against the debtor.

The Bankruptcy Code sets forth the relative priority of claims against a debtor and the waterfall in which such claims are typically paid. In order for a court to confirm a plan over a dissenting class of creditors – what is commonly called a “cram-down” – the Bankruptcy Code demands thateither (i) the dissenting class receives the full value of its claim, or (ii) no classes junior to that class receive any property under the plan on account of their junior claims or interests. This is known as the “absolute priority rule.”