If Peter Morton and Cinitel Corp. had their way, every lender would have a distinct duty to a guarantor to permit the sale of a defaulting borrower’s assets as a going concern. In their view, a lender should be required to maximize its recovery from the borrower and to minimize any claim made on a guarantee. Fulfilling that duty would also obligate a lender to keep funding a borrower while that asset sale was negotiated and completed. It is enough to make any lender cringe.

Fortunately, the Ontario Court of Appeal disagreed with Morton and Cinitel’s view of the lending world.

In an earlier edition of Fully Secured (June 27, 2012 – Volume 3, Number 2), we reported on the Ontario Court of Justice decision in Snoek ⁷ where security granted by a borrower (“HSLP”) to a group of individual creditors (“B”) was held to constitute an improper preference and declared invalid following a challenge by the trustee in bankruptcy. B had been one victim of a Ponzi scheme involving numerous unsecured creditors of HSLP.

In a decision further defining when US public policy restricts the relief a court may grant in aid of a foreign restructuring or insolvency proceeding, the Bankruptcy Court in the Chapter 15 case of Vitro, S.A.B. de C.V. v. ACP Master, Ltd. (In re Vitro, S.A.B. de C.V.), Ch. 15 Case No. 11-33335-HDH-15, 2012 WL 2138112 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Jun. 13, 2012) refused to a enforce a Mexican restructuring plan that novated and extinguished the guaranty obligations of the Mexican debtor’s non-debtor subsidiary guarantors.

Whether a secured creditor has an absolute right to credit bid at a sale under a chapter 11 plan has been the subject of conflicting decisions rendered by the Third, Fifth and Seventh Circuits.¹ The United States Supreme Court has resolved these inconsistent rulings with its decision in RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC, et al., v. Amalgamated Bank, ² which affirmed the Seventh Circuit’s holding that a secured creditor has an absolute right to credit bid in a sale under a chapter 11 plan.

Section 541(a) of the Bankruptcy Code creates a worldwide estate comprising all of the legal or equitable interests of the debtor, “wherever located,” held by the debtor as of the filing date.¹ The Bankruptcy Code’s automatic stay, in turn, applies “to all entities” and protects the debtor’s property and the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction by barring “any act to obtain possession of property of the estate . . .

Having enforceable security over all of a borrower’s assets is obviously of primary importance to a lender.  However, where a borrower occupies leased premises, ensuring the lender has quick and reliable access to the collateral is equally important, especially if the landlord proves to be unco-operative after a borrower’s default.  Although court-ordered access to a borrower’s leased premises can be sought after a borrower’s loan default, a landlord waiver obtained prior to an initial advance of a loan can bring some added certainty to the realization process outside of a bankrup

On September 2, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed a holding by the Court of Chancery that creditors of insolvent Delaware limited liability companies do not have standing to sue derivatively. This contrasts with Delaware corporations: the Delaware courts have recognized that when a corporation becomes insolvent, creditors become the residual risk-bearers and are permitted to sue derivatively on behalf of a corporation to the same extent as stockholders.

Introduction

On June 23, 2011, after fifteen years of hugely acrimonious litigation, the Supreme Court of the United States (the “Court”) issued a decision on a narrow legal issue that may end up significantly limiting the scope of bankruptcy courts’ core jurisdiction.  

Section 108 of the Bankruptcy Code grants a two-year extension of time for a trustee in bankruptcy (or a debtor in possession) to bring law suits, provided that the applicable period to sue didn’t expire before the petition date. It also gives a short extension to the trustee for filing pleadings, curing defaults, and performing other acts on behalf of the debtor. These provisions afford a trustee and debtor in possession valuable time to discover and evaluate potential causes of action and to perform other acts to preserve the debtor’s rights.

In a recent decision, SEC v Byers,1 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that district courts possess the authority and discretion to bar the filing of involuntary bankruptcy petitions without the district court’s permission.