Some six years after the United States Supreme Court decided Stern v. Marshall, courts continue to grapple with the decision’s meaning and how much it curtails the exercise of bankruptcy court jurisdiction.[1] The U.S.
On March 22, 2017, the United States Supreme Court held that bankruptcy courts cannot approve a “structured dismissal”—a dismissal with special conditions or that does something other than restoring the “prepetition financial status quo”—providing for distributions that deviate from the Bankruptcy Code’s priority scheme absent the consent of affected creditors. Czyzewski v.Jevic Holding Corp., No. 15-649, 580 U.S. ___ (2017), 2017 WL 1066259, at *3 (Mar. 22, 2017).
On March 29, 2016, the Second Circuit addressed the breadth and application of the Bankruptcy Code's safe harbor provisions in an opinion that applied to two cases before it. The court analyzed whether: (i) the Bankruptcy Code's safe harbor provisions preempt individual creditors' state law fraudulent conveyance claims; and (ii) the automatic stay bars creditors from asserting such claims while the trustee is actively pursuing similar claims under the Bankruptcy Code. In In re Tribune Co.
On May 21, 2015, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (the "Third Circuit") held that in rare instances a bankruptcy court may approve a "structured dismissal"- that is, a dismissal "that winds up the bankruptcy with certain conditions attached instead of simply dismissing the case and restoring the status quo ante" - that deviates from the Bankruptcy Code's priority scheme. See Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors v. CIT Group/Business Credit Inc. (In re Jevic Holding Corp.), Case No.
Earlier this year, we reported on a decision limiting a secured creditor's right to credit bid purchased debt (capping the credit bid at the discounted price paid for the debt) to facilitate an auction in Fisker Automotive Holdings' chapter 11 case.1 In the weeks that followed, the debtor held a competitive (nineteen-round) auction and ultimately selected Wanxiang America Corporation, rather than the secured creditor, as the w
Overview
The Court of Appeal has decided that rent accruing during a period of administration should be treated as an expense of the administration, irrespective of the date on which it falls due for payment. Administration expenses are paid by administrators in priority to liabilities owed to holders of security.
Comfort letters can be a useful tool for providing an assurance of support from a parent to a subsidiary company. In some cases they help inform the decision of the board of a subsidiary and its continuing trade. It's possible for such letters to form binding obligations in law, if carefully considered and drafted.
Key points
- The High Court has ruled that, where a tenant goes into administration, rent which is payable in advance and falls due before the commencement of the administration is not recoverable by the landlord as an administration expense
- Landlords must take their place with other unsecured creditors in relation to sums payable before the appointment of administrators, even if they relate to a period during which the administrators had use of the property
Background