On March 29, 2016, the Second Circuit addressed the breadth and application of the Bankruptcy Code's safe harbor provisions in an opinion that applied to two cases before it. The court analyzed whether: (i) the Bankruptcy Code's safe harbor provisions preempt individual creditors' state law fraudulent conveyance claims; and (ii) the automatic stay bars creditors from asserting such claims while the trustee is actively pursuing similar claims under the Bankruptcy Code. In In re Tribune Co.
The District Court for the Central District of California recently held that an assignee that acquired rights to a terminated swap agreement was not a "swap participant" under the Bankruptcy Code and, therefore, could not invoke safe harbors based on that status to foreclose on collateral in the face of the automatic stay. [1] The court ruled that the assignee acquired only a right to collect payment under the swap agreement, not the assignor's rights under the Bankruptcy Code to exercise remedies without first seeking court approval.
Background
On May 21, 2015, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (the "Third Circuit") held that in rare instances a bankruptcy court may approve a "structured dismissal"- that is, a dismissal "that winds up the bankruptcy with certain conditions attached instead of simply dismissing the case and restoring the status quo ante" - that deviates from the Bankruptcy Code's priority scheme. See Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors v. CIT Group/Business Credit Inc. (In re Jevic Holding Corp.), Case No.
On October 31, 2014, Bankruptcy Judge Kaplan of the District of New Jersey addressed two issues critically important to intellectual property licensees and purchasers: (i) can a trademark licensee use section 365(n) of the Bankruptcy Code to keep licensed marks following a debtor-licensor’s rejection of a license agreement?; and (ii) can a “free and clear” sale of intellectual property eliminate any rights retained by a licensee? In re Crumbs Bake Shop, Inc., et al., 2014 WL 5508177 (Bankr. D.N.J. Oct. 31, 2014).
Earlier this year, we reported on a decision limiting a secured creditor's right to credit bid purchased debt (capping the credit bid at the discounted price paid for the debt) to facilitate an auction in Fisker Automotive Holdings' chapter 11 case.1 In the weeks that followed, the debtor held a competitive (nineteen-round) auction and ultimately selected Wanxiang America Corporation, rather than the secured creditor, as the w
The recent decision in BNY Corporate Trustee Services Limited v Eurosail - UK 2007 - 3BL PLC (Eurosail) has provided helpful guidance on the interpretation of the insolvency tests set out in section 123 of the Insolvency Act 1986. This guidance is not only relevant to companies with financial problems. The common practice of drafting contractual events of default by reference to section 123 means that it has significance to anyone who is creating or is party to contracts (whether finance documents or other commercial contracts) containing this type of provision.
Comfort letters can be a useful tool for providing an assurance of support from a parent to a subsidiary company. In some cases they help inform the decision of the board of a subsidiary and its continuing trade. It's possible for such letters to form binding obligations in law, if carefully considered and drafted.
"Leaving the mice in charge of the cheese..." is how one commentator described the now far from unusual phenomenon of the pre-pack administration sale. But what is meant by a "pre-pack"; are they lawful and what is the legitimate area for concern? While they were fairly uncommon in the past, pre-packs now seem to have become all the rage. Why? What scope is there for challenge or review if abuse is suspected?
What is a "pre-pack"?